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Abstract
While much legal research involves foreign law and much 
of foreign law exists in a foreign language, the issue of 
translation has attracted limited theoretical attention 
only. In particular, few lawyers are aware of the work issu-
ing from fields like literary criticism, philosophy, or trans-
lation studies. Urging acknowledgment and redress of 
such a serious epistemic deficit, basing itself on a critical 
approach to foreignness, this article offers a constructive 
guide to the making of just translations. A noteworthy 
feature of the argument concerns the formulation of 
conclusions that can fairly be expected to run counter-in-
tuitively to a lawyer’s unexamined assumptions. Indeed, 
much of what is received as conventional wisdom about 
the translation of foreign law is either ill-considered or 
plain wrong.
Keywords: comparative law; foreign law; critical theory; 
translation; interpretation.
Resumo
Embora muitas pesquisas jurídicas envolvam Direito es-
trangeiro e grande parte do Direito estrangeiro exista em 
um idioma estrangeiro, a questão da tradução atraiu ape-
nas uma atenção teorética limitada. Em particular, poucos 
juristas estão cientes do trabalho proveniente de áreas 
como crítica literária, filosofia ou estudos de tradução. 
Instando o reconhecimento e a correção de um déficit epis-
têmico tão sério, baseando-se em uma abordagem crítica 
da estrangeirice, este artigo oferece um guia construtivo 
para a realização de traduções justas. Uma característica 
digna de nota da argumentação refere-se à formulação 
de conclusões das quais se pode razoavelmente esperar 
que se manifestem de forma contra-intuitiva às suposições 
não examinadas de um jurista. Na verdade, muito do que 
é recebido como sabedoria convencional sobre a tradução 
de Direito estrangeiro ou é irrefletido ou totalmente errado.
Palavras-chave: Direito Comparado; Direito estrangeiro; 
teoria crítica; tradução; interpretação.
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 “Said is missaid”. 
–Beckett1
“Peter [...] is not a translation of Pierre”.
–Derrida2
The central place of language in life seems undeniable. We use language to command, 
to claim, to philosophize, to plead, and to praise. We use it in poetry, obituaries, and 
actuarial reports. We use it directly or obliquely (“How are you” need not be a question 
about health). We use it to confess, to testify. We use it constatively and performatively 
(“I name this horse ‘Biscaïa’, and I name this other horse ‘Grégaou’”). We tell jokes and 
attempt to convince. We talk to our spouses. We talk to ourselves. We commit to our 
friends. We lie to our colleagues. And think how we read so many kinds of texts and 
hear orations of such various sorts, all composed of words. But language’s significance 
holds even more primordially. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that “[o]nly where 
[there is] language, there is world”,3 or, if you will, that “[n]o thing is where the word 
lacks”.4  In other terms, language is the condition of possibility of all experience of world. 
Only what one calls a mountain can exist as a mountain (“Oh! Look at the mountain 
over there...”). And then, one can only see the mountain in words. In one’s head, one 
says: “It is huge”; “It is beautiful”; “It is white”; “There is snow”. Without words, one is 
unable to see the mountain. Language therefore constitutes what one experiences in 
one’s world. Consider a hot bath. What is a hot bath? It is what one calls a hot bath, what 
one so designates. It is not that the hot bath exists as such in advance of ascription of 
meaning on one’s part. Rather, one’s words constitute the bath as hot (“Oh! It is hot...”). 
Indeed, “[i]t is the world of words that creates the world of things”.5 So Samuel Beckett, 
percipiently: “What can you say, words it is, nothing else going”.6
1  BECKETT, S. Worstward Ho. In: Company/Ill Seen Ill Said/Worstward Ho/Stirrings Still. D. Van Hulle (ed.). 
London: Faber & Faber, 2009 [1983]. p. 97.
2  DERRIDA, J. Psyché. vol. 1. 2nd edn. Paris: Galilée, 1998. p. 209 [“Peter (…) n’est pas une traduction de 
Pierre”].
3  HEIDEGGER, M. Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. F.-W. von Herrmann (ed.). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
2012 [1971]. p. 38 [“Nur wo Sprache, da ist Welt”].
4  HEIDEGGER, M. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959. p. 163 [“Kein Ding ist, wo das Wort 
gebricht”]. 
5  LACAN, J. Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse. In: Ecrits. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1966 [1953]. p. 276 [“C’est le monde des mots qui crée le monde des choses”].
6  The quotation is an answer Beckett gave Niklaus Gessner, his interviewer. For the transcript, revealing that 
Beckett spoke in French, see GESSNER, N. Die Unzulänglichkeit der Sprache. Zürich: Juris, 1957. p. 75 [“Que 
voulez-vous, Monsieur, c’est les mots, on n’a rien d’autre”].
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Now, each language constitutes its world differently from the way in which 
each other language constitutes its own world so that there are at least as many 
worlds as there are languages. To reprise José Ortega y Gasset’s famous example, 
the semantic extension of the Spanish language’s “bosque” differs from that of the 
German language’s “Wald”,7 and while English features words like “wood”, “timber”, and 
“woods” (as in “a walk in the woods”), French has “bois” only.8 To press the differential 
point further, contemplate three Spanish sentences: “Quiero a mi mujer”, “Me gusta 
vino”, and “Yo amo el fado”. The Spanish verbs “querer”, “gustar”, and “amar” all translate 
into French as “aimer” (“J’aime ma femme”, “J’aime le vin”, and “J’aime le fado”). In sum, 
“language manifests itself in reality only as a multiplicity”,9 and “in every language 
there lies a characteristic world-view”,10 which is why a situation being described with a 
verb in the future perfect in French can well feature a modal verb expressing necessity 
in English – thus “Il aura oublié son rendez-vous” becomes “He must have forgotten 
his appointment”. And the French “rendez-vous” is masculine, a gender assignment 
that makes no sense in English.11 (Surely, the fact that the French for “masculinity” is 
feminine – it is “la masculinité” – does not make much sense either.) Meanwhile, the 
German language, which also ascribes gender identities, has “moon” in the masculine 
(“der Mond”) and “sun” in the feminine (“die Sonne”), French claiming precisely the 
opposite (“la lune” and “le soleil”). Also, German allows for neutral terms in addition 
to masculine and feminine ones, an option unknown to French. “Pig”, for example, is 
neutral in German (“das Schwein”), although it is masculine in French (“le cochon”). 
Still along differentiating lines, envisage how “La Belle au bois dormant” and 
“Sleeping Beauty” have long reflexively been deemed interchangeable expressions. Yet, 
where is the forestal allusion in English? And “Little Red Riding Hood” is evidently “Le 
Petit chaperon rouge”, Charles Perrault’s 1697 story. But why the evocation of movement 
and travel on horseback in English (the reference is to the cloak that would be worn by 
riding women as an enveloping garment)? For its part, like the French version, Jacob 
7  ORTEGA Y GASSET, J. Miseria y esplendor de la traducción. In: Obras completas. vol. 5. 2nd edn. Madrid: 
Alianza Editorial, 1994 [1946]. p. 436.
8  For this illustration, see ECO, U. Dire quasi la stessa cosa. Milano: Bompiani 2003. p. 40.
9  HUMBOLDT, W. von. Über die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues. In: Gesammelte 
Schriften. vol. 6/1, A. Leitzmann (ed.). Berlin: Behr, 1907 [1829]. p. 240 [“(d)ie Sprache erscheint in der 
Wirklichkeit nur als ein Vielfaches”]. This text is Humboldt’s so-called “Kawi-Werk”, a monumental study of the 
Kavi language on the island of Java, which remained incomplete at the time of the author’s death in 1835.
10  HUMBOLDT, W. von. Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluß auf 
die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts. In: Gesammelte Schriften. vol. 7/1, A. Leitzmann (ed.). 
Berlin: Behr, 1907 [1836†]. p. 60 [“in jeder Sprache (liegt) eine eigenthümliche Weltansicht”]. This publication, 
which came to stand as Humboldt’s most famous writing, appeared shortly after the author’s death. It is an 
edited and substantially abbreviated version of Humboldt (note 9).
11  Cf. SEDARIS, D. Me Talk Pretty One Day. Boston: Little, Brown, 2000. p. 188: “Of all the stumbling blocks 
inherent in learning [French], the greatest for me is the principle that each noun has a corresponding sex that 
affects both its articles and its adjectives”.
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and Wilhelm Grimm’s German 1812 fairy tale, “Rotkaeppchen”, does not connote riding 
gear. Observe also that the differential issue I address is not confined strictly to the 
linguistic aspect and extends to culture more broadly understood – thus Umberto 
Eco: “[T]he expressions ‘donnez-moi un café’, ‘give me a coffee’, and ‘mi dia un caffé’ 
[...] are not culturally equivalent. Uttered in different countries, they produce different 
effects and they are used to refer to different habits. They produce different stories. 
Consider these two sentences, one from an Italian novel, the other from an American 
one: ‘Ordinai un caffé, lo buttai giù in un secondo ed uscii dal bar’ (literally, ‘I ordered a 
coffee, swilled it down in a second and went out of the bar’); and ‘He spent half an hour 
with the cup in his hands, sipping his coffee and thinking of Mary’. The first sentence 
can only refer to an Italian coffee and to an Italian bar, since an American coffee cannot 
be swallowed in a second both because of its quantity and of its temperature. The 
second sentence cannot refer to an Italian subject (at least to an average one drinking 
an average espresso) because it presupposes a large cup containing what seems like 
gallons of coffee”.12 As these diverse instances reveal in short order, language matters 
crucially to world-making and so does the idiomaticity of each language, whether from 
a strictly linguistic or wider cultural standpoint.13
Bringing these insights to bear on law, it seems safe to affirm at the outset, if in 
advance of empirical study, that the presence of foreign law, howsoever foreignness 
be defined, is more frequent and assertive within legal research and writing – whether 
legislative, judicial, or academic (broadly understood) – than the situation that would 
have prevailed fifty or even twenty-five years ago. Persistent manifestations of nationalist 
retrenchment nothwithstanding, references to foreign materials are arguably set to 
expand further if only because technology makes foreign legal information ever-more 
readily available, either in the source-language or in translation. A handful of exceptions 
aside,14 legal scholars in particular have nonetheless failed to appreciate that, whether 
the translation work is their own or someone else’s on whose effort they are relying, any 
12  ECO, U. Experiences of Translation. A. McEwen (transl.). Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. p. 17-
18. Eco subsequently rewrote this text in his native Italian, incorporating a number of emendations. See Eco 
(note 8), p. 168.
13  For a bold reflection on how different languages construct different experiences of sexuality, see STEINER, 
G. My Unwritten Books. New York: New Directions, 2014. p. 68-90.
14  See eg ŠARČEVIĆ, S. New Approach to Legal Translation. Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1997; OLSEN, F; LORZ, A.; 
STEIN, D. (eds.). Translation Issues in Language and Law. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; GLANERT, S. De 
la traductibilité du droit. Paris: Dalloz, 2011; GLANERT, S. (ed.). Comparative Law – Engaging Translation. 
London: Routledge, 2014; SORIANO-BARABINO, G. Comparative Law for Legal Translators. Bern: Lang, 2016; 
BIEL, Ł. et al (eds.). Research Methods in Legal Translation and Interpreting. London: Routledge, 2019. See 
also eg LEGRAND, P. Issues in the Translatability of Law. In: BERMANN, S.; WOOD, M. (eds.). Nation, Language, 
and the Ethics of Translation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. p. 30-50. For a collaborative 
effort, see GLANERT, S.; LEGRAND, P. Foreign Law in Translation: If Truth Be Told…. In: FREEMAN, M.; SMITH, F. 
(eds.). Law and Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 513-32. For an investigation of the legal 
translation “industry”, see SCOTT, J. R. Legal Translation Outsourced. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
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exercise in linguistic transposition must carry difficult and consequential theoretical 
choices that entail compelling practical implications inasmuch as the translative 
decisions being made frame and fixate the texts that readers will get to know across 
languages. 
For someone who does not have German and can access Kafka in English only, 
it is the translator of Der Prozeß into English who will have determined the text that 
one gets to read in English. Assuming the translator has opted to convey the German 
title as The Trial, for example, this particular designation will become the only text that 
anglophone readers are to know. For them, Kafka is therefore the author of a novel 
entitled The Trial, a substantive that squarely focusses on judicial proceedings. However, 
if the English translator had translated the German title as The Process, anglophone 
readers would not be thinking of judicial proceedings, but rather of a series of 
mechanical operations, perhaps administrative or bureaucratic in character. One may, 
of course, imagine a trial as part of such mechanics, but the term “process” need not 
evoke a trial at all. Briefly to pursue the law-and-literature theme, the English translation 
of Albert Camus’s L’Etranger as The Stranger or The Foreigner heralds two different texts, 
the first insisting on lack of familiarity in some form or other, the second showcasing 
an individual coming from another country. The first emphasis is broader, and only the 
second translation can possibly evoke a legal dimension. Depending on the translator’s 
decision, anglophone readers without access to the French language will therefore be 
presented with either one of two ascertainably different texts under Camus’s name. 
In either case, “it would be utopian to pretend that the reader of a translation is truly 
experiencing the original”.15
Given that language matters so significantly, that idiomaticity is so important 
also, that the impact of translation is so serious as to entail different translations making 
for the articulation of different texts and channelling the reader’s apprehension of the 
author’s work in different directions, that a particular translation prompts the reader 
to think of the work as addressing this topic rather than that, it must follow that the 
translator’s choices require to be informed by theoretical insights whose sophistication 
must be on a par with their momentousness. Yet, there is little evidence, certainly as 
regards legal research and writing, that much rigour is being applied to translative 
interventions – an observation that coheres with my earlier remark to the effect that 
legal scholars do not realize the complexities at stake. Consider comparative law, the 
field where the treatment of foreign law is elevated to a specific form of professional 
expertise. Despite devoting a number of pages to the salient theoretical issues arising 
from the comparison of laws, even as “an investigation of comparative law should 
15  POLIZZOTTI, M. Sympathy for the Traitor. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2018. p. 5.
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also concern the translation of texts of law”,16 the leading textbook having guided 
comparative research since the late 1970s is silent on language matters.17 So is the 
comparatist who has long been the most prominent voice of epistemic opposition in 
the field.18 For its part, the only textbook that, at this writing, can legitimately aspire 
to replace the heretofore standard work and institute itself as the new model of 
intellectual governance within comparative law holds that the question of translation 
may ultimately be addressed most simplistically indeed: those taking an interest in 
Japanese law who can read Japanese do, while those who cannot content themselves 
with available translations – the two approaches seemingly on an epistemic par.19 For 
the comparatist expressing such a jejune view, there are apparently no larger theoretical 
matters arising.
This article contends that legal scholars who encounter foreign law, whether in 
the foreign language or by way of a published translation, cannot afford to abdicate 
epistemic responsibility and need to be aware of a range of basic theoretical concerns 
that require crucial elections to be made in the course of displacement across languages, 
these determinations effectively prompting the production of different texts, not least 
from the readership’s standpoint. The fact that “affirmative action” can be translated, 
in French, by way of the expression “discrimination positive” (as in France) or “action 
positive” (as in Canada) shows the dangers that befall the ignorance of translation 
theory altogether (Zweigert and Kötz/Frankenberg) or its depreciation as a non-
issue (Kischel). Indeed, texts featuring “discrimination positive” or “action positive” are 
different texts, each heralding a singular sensibility vis-à-vis the practice of affirmative 
action. And these different texts are properly perceived by readers as different texts, 
one expressing a critical view of affirmative action, the other enunciating support. In 
the end, the impact of the translator’s election on the opinion that the francophone 
reader forms of affirmative action cannot be in doubt.
Meanwhile, there exists a huge body of learning in fields like literary criticism, 
philosophy, and translation studies, with which legal scholars remain largely 
unconversant and that can readily assist the translator-at-law in search of an informed 
resolution to the quandary he must address. Harnessing such information and casting 
it as legally relevant – as being pertinent to the re-statement of foreign law across 
languages (and therefore as other than non-law) – this article offers academics dealing 
in foreignness within a scholarly setting a set of theoretical reflections and practical 
recommendations with a view to the formulation of translations purporting to be just, 
16  Derrida (note 2), p. 228 [“une enquête de droit comparé devrait aussi concerner la traduction des textes de 
droit”].
17  See ZWEIGERT, K.; KÖTZ, H. Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung. 3rd edn. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1996. p. 1-61.
18  See FRANKENBERG, G. Comparative Law as Critique. Cheltenham: Elgar, 2016.
19  See KISCHEL, U. Rechtsvergleichung. Munich: Beck, 2015. p. 9.
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that is, aiming to do justice to the source-text – which I regard as the abiding ambition 
that a translation can (and must) pursue. This advice also purports to do justice to the 
translator’s activism, to recognize the translator’s input. Now, in accordance with my 
personal experience of many years’ work as a comparatist, I find that my conclusions 
prove intriguing in a number of respects vis-à-vis the unexamined assumptions 
that legal scholars readily harbour – namely, that everything is translatable, that an 
uttered sentence has a definite meaning permanently inhering to it and available 
to its translator, that a knowing and all-powerful translator enjoys complete and 
incontrovertible access to the writer’s mind, that the writer’s intentions are perfectly 
transferable across languages, that a translation must be evaluated in terms of its 
fidelity to a source-text, that such correctness or exactitude is at once achievable and 
assessable so that some translations can rightly be said to be true to the source-text 
and, chiefly, that the translator’s presence must therefore be felt as little as possible, 
the ideal being something along the lines of invisibility. Discarding such dusty 
epistemological clutter, superfluous to contemporary discourse on translation, this 
article seeks to invigorate the ways in which researchers in foreign law theorize and 
practice translative interventions.20 In the hope of facilitating matters, I proceed by way 
of twelve rubrics, each being preceded with a short heading that aims to capture the 
gist of the relevant claim. Before I begin, however, I find it important to enter three sets 
of general observations. 
First, I maintain that I am firmly operating in the realm of interpretation, which 
means that, strictly speaking, I do not regard any of the assertions that follow to be 
pertaining to truth, no matter how strongly I happen to be subscribing to them. Indeed, 
it would be extraordinarily authoritarian and arrogant on my part to contend that I can 
ascertain and state truth. This is not at all the spirit in which I advocate for the twelve 
bundles of exhortations that I have assembled. What I propose is rather what I deem 
to qualify as the best interpretations out of the wide range of available interpretations 
with which I am acquainted – what I consider to be the interpretations offering optimal 
theoretical and practical yield, that is, the interpretations making for the most creditable 
translation work, for translations revealing themselves to be most favourably just 
vis-à-vis the source-texts that they enunciate anew.21 Also, I do not at all profess that 
20  It bears emphasizing that this Article addresses situations ascertainably featuring both a primary text 
and a subsequent translation thereof. For example, the argument is not concerned with instances where, 
two or more languages having been deemed equally official as a matter of law, the legislative process has 
the language-versions of the relevant statute being drafted simultaneously through an incessant movement 
of back-and-forth across languages, neither of which then being properly regardable as a primary text or a 
translation. Eg: ŠARČEVIĆ, S. The Quest for Legislative Bilingualism and Multilingualism: Co-drafting in Canada 
and Switzerland. In: GÉMAR, J-C.; KASIRER, N. (eds.). Jurilinguistique: entre langues et droits/ Jurilinguistics: 
Between Law and Language. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2005. p. 277-292.
21  Cf. HARCOURT, B. E. Critique and Praxis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2020. p. 28: “What I am 
telling is not the truth, but an interpretation”.
PIERRE LEGRAND
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 3, p. 601-654, set./dez. 2021.608 
I am acting objectively. Quite to the contrary, I write on the basis of my socialization 
and of my institutionalization – of my epistemologization – into the law in general and 
into comparative law in particular, that is, against the backdrop of my enculturation, on 
account of the culture – of the cultural complex – into which I have been thrown and 
that I have incorporated and that I now embody. How, indeed, could I be intervening 
in any other way than as an encultured translator? There is more, for no translation can 
possibly be constituted without an array of assertive resolutions orienting the work, 
every single one an act of power, a foreclosing of certain understandings through a 
selection of others (it could have been that word, but it will be this one...). Indeed, there 
is no possibility of a powerless translation. Now, these animating epistemic features 
must exclude any posture that would prove the least evocative of neutrality (no matter 
how one is prepared to circumscribe the terminological reach of this term). 
Secondly, the enjoinders I develop emphatically do not have to do with method. 
For greater precision, let me say that I am not propounding anything like a method 
of translation. Most problematically, I think, method heralds a kind of predictability, a 
sort of rigidity even – at any rate, a linearity. Indeed, John Law remarks that “[m]ethod 
[…] is a system for offering more or less bankable guarantees. It hopes to guide us 
more or less quickly and securely to our destination, a destination that is taken to be 
knowledge about the processes at work in a single world. It hopes to limit the risks 
that we entertain along the way”.22 I find such purported enframing to be profoundly 
incompatible with the interpretive dimension that must inform any translation work 
and involve, by definition so to speak, uncircumventable contingency. In my view, there 
is a further difficulty arising, which is that method, in line with its ancestral Cartesian 
pedigree, would effectively claim to insinuate a certain degree of “scientificity” to 
the translative endeavour. Indeed, the very point of method is that it should afford a 
strategy permitting to obviate personal input on the translator’s part.23 For myself, even 
as I staunchly argue that any translator has a duty to keep personalization in check, 
whether on account of unduly ethnocentric proclivities or other excessively hampering 
idiosyncrasies, I am steadfastly of the view that it is neither possible nor desirable to 
pretend to be cancelling singular inclinations on account of method. Specifically, not 
only is any method someone’s method – indeed, method is always designed with a goal 
in mind, which eschews any idea of impartiality at the outset – but the deployment of 
method by anyone must feature a personal angle, since one necessarily brings to bear 
22  LAW, J. After Method. London: Routledge, 2004. p. 9.
23  In his prominent seventeenth-century Discours de la méthode, Descartes objected to the idea that there 
would ultimately exist nothing more epistemologically trustworthy than one’s enculturation, that the outcome 
of one’s representations should, in the end, fall prey to the fact that one had been raised with “the French”, “the 
Germans”, “the Chinese”, or “the Cannibals”: DESCARTES, R. Discours de la méthode. In: Œuvres philosophiques, 
vol. 1, F. Alquié (ed.). Paris: Garnier, 1997 [1637], II, p. 583-584 [“des Français”/“des Allemands”/“des Chinois”/“des 
Cannibales”].
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one’s own understanding of the method in question.24 Instead of method, I therefore 
commend a series of protocols in order markedly to enhance the ethical and epistemic 
virtues – the warrant – of scholarly translation in law. It is not at all, then, that anything 
goes.
Thirdly, while I accept that there exist Englishes – that “privacy” does not mean 
to a California law teacher what it signifies to an English academic or that the Australian 
courts’ interpretation of the word “commerce” as regards the Trade and Commerce 
Power in the Australian constitution differs from the US courts’ interpretation of 
“commerce” pursuant to the Commerce Clause in the US constitution, which entails 
that “privacy” is not “privacy” or that “commerce” is not “commerce” – I do not concern 
myself with situations involving a move from one English to another (or, say, from 
European to Brazilian Portuguese). Without pronouncing on the debate amongst 
linguists as to whether one is then dealing with different languages or with dialects of 
a unique language (a question that might solve itself differently depending on whether 
one is considering English or Portuguese), I envision instances where the fact that one 
is operating interlingually is effectively beyond dispute. I have in mind, say, the shift 
from English to Portuguese or that from German to French. 
I now turn to my contentions, which I aim to delineate as neatly as I can although 
I acknowledge that occasional overlap is inevitable. Indeed – contrary to what the idea 
of method and its clockworky ways would suggest – the process of translation does not 
allow itself to be captured in a series of watertight compartments. My sequence runs 
thus:
1 To translate is to differentiate.             
2 Untranslatability is the translator’s guiding motif.
3 Translation features a constant tension between two supremacies, that of the translator 
over the text and that of the text over the translator. In the end, the text carries.
4 A translation is unavoidably autobiographical.
5 A translation cannot be true (but it can be false).
6 Translation is a second original.
7 Failure to translate is an opportunity.
8 Hearken to the source-text.
9 Recognize (and challenge) the injustices pertaining to published translations.
10 Translation must not abide by a method.
11 Translation must track the source-text as closely as possible even if it should make 
for disruptive reading in the target-language.
12 Recognize that the translator is an inventor.
24  Cf. Law (note 22), p. 143: “[M]ethod is not, and could never be, innocent or purely technical”.
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Now, zur Sache selbst!
•
1  To translate is to differentiate.             
As you prepare to translate, do acknowledge – do accept – that translation is not an 
activity that can ever achieve mutual understanding across languages or allow two 
languages to reach agreement with one another. Simply avoid such delusion. What a 
translator does instead, and all that he can ever do, is to articulate difference. Indeed, 
“translation is not at all destined to make difference disappear of which it is on the 
contrary the play: constantly it alludes to it, it conceals it, but sometimes by revealing 
it and often by accentuating it, it is the life itself of that difference”.25 Note how such 
difference is a structural component of every translation and cannot therefore be 
erased or overcome, no matter how excellent your translative effort. In other terms, 
notwithstanding his hardest work, the translator, upon considering the two texts 
at hand – the text being translated (the source-text) and the text in translation (the 
target-text) – requires to admit that the two forms of words must incessantly differ.26 
At the outset, you therefore have to resist thinking of the languages coming into the 
translation process in terms of “identity”, “ipseity”, “duplication”, “sameness”, “similarity”, 
“commonality”, “consensus”, “relation”, “alliance”, “consilience”, “reconciliation”, and 
“continuity” (or, in French, “mêmeté”). Rather, translation demands the mobilization and 
application of ideas like “distinction”, “otherness”, “dissensus”, “interruption”, “disrelation”, 
“discontinuity”, “change”, “mutation”, “transformation”, “generativity”, “seriality”, 
“supplementation”, and “invention”. Let me insist: identity is ever breached, and 
“[e]quivalence is an interpretive fiction”.27
Since there can be no bridge or passage of any kind across languages,28 
because there can be no communication, say, from English to French,29 a translator 
25  BLANCHOT, M. L’Amitié. Paris: Gallimard, 1971. p. 70-71 [“la traduction n’est nullement destinée à faire 
disparaître la différence dont elle est au contraire le jeu: constamment elle y fait allusion, elle la dissimule, mais 
parfois en la révélant et souvent en l’accentuant, elle est la vie même de cette différence”].
26  “Source-text” and “source-language”, “target-text” and “target-language” are received expressions within 
translation studies. While I find them inadequate – I especially dislike “target” inasmuch as the term intimates 
that the translator is taking aim at the host-language or perhaps attacking it – I have learned there is little point 
in fighting the proverbial windmills.
27  ROBINSON, D. The Translator’s Turn. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. p. 259. Interestingly, 
Willard Quine, a foremost analytical philosopher, refers to “sameness of meaning” as “an ill-conceived notion 
within traditional semantics”: QUINE, W. V. Indeterminacy of Translation Again. Journal of Philosophy, New 
York, vol. 84, n. 1, p. 5-10, 1987. p. 10.
28  See DERRIDA, J. La Bête et le souverain. vol. 2, M. Lisse; M.-L. Mallet; G. Michaud (eds.). Paris: Galilée, 2010 
[2002]. p. 31.
29  Consider PIRANDELLO, L. Uno, nessuno e centomila. P. Cudini (ed.). Firenze: Giunti, 1994 [1926]. p. 32: 
“We have used, I and you, the same language, the same words. But are we at fault, I and you, if the words in 
themselves are empty? Empty, my dear. And you fill them with your meaning, as you speak them to me; and 
I, welcoming them, inevitably, fill them with my meaning. We believed we understood each other; we did not 
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must even dismiss such notion as “dialogue”, in effect, a stagnant cloud of obscurity. 
A key operational word for translation is rather “monologue”.30 Indeed, what takes 
place as translation materializes is the co-existence of two monologues – and these 
monologues are involved in a negotiation at the translator’s behest (it is, in effect, the 
translator who is compelling the languages into interaction).31 Now, in accordance with 
Leibniz’s Law,32 if there is more than one language or monologue in co-presence, there 
must be difference between them, irreducibly so. Leibniz’s insight is that if there is more 
than one of anything, of any entity, there can no longer be identity (or id-entity) – which 
means that there has to be difference. (Observe therefore that, contrary to the prevailing 
if unexamined view, words like “sameness” or “similarity” effectively mean difference: for 
A to be the same as B or for A to be similar to B, there must be A and B, that is, there 
must be more than one entity, which means that there must be difference between A 
and B. Nelson Goodman, the influential US philosopher, thus perspicaciously remarks 
how “[s]imilarity, ever ready to solve philosophical problems and overcome obstacles, 
is a pretender, an impostor, a quack”.33)
Crucially, the fact that translation necessarily operates as differentiation is not 
to be regretted. Rather, translation thereby finds itself able to acknowledge the source-
text’s entitlement to recognition and respect. Writing as regards reading, Jacques 
Derrida exclaims: “First rule: respect for the other, that is, for his right to difference”.34 
This injunction applies to translation, too.
2  Untranslatability is the translator’s guiding motif.
It is crucial, I contend, that you should readily appreciate how the task of translation 
is, in effect, an impossibility. Indeed, “translation is another name for the impossible”.35 
understand each other at all” [“Abbiamo usato, io e voi la stessa lingua, le stesse parole. Ma che colpa abbiamo, 
io e voi, se le parole, per sé, sono vuote? Vuote, caro mio. E voi le riempite del senso vostro, nel dimerle; e io 
nell’accoglierle, inevitabilmente, le riempio del senso mio. Abbiamo creduto d’intenderci; non ci siamo intesi 
affatto”].
30  Eg: Heidegger (note 4), p. 265: “[L]anguage is monologue”; it speaks “lonesomely” [“(D)ie Sprache ist 
Monolog”/“einsam”] (emphasis omitted).
31  Cf. LEGENDRE, P. Le Désir politique de Dieu. Paris: Fayard, 1988. p. 183: “[D]ogmatic systems as such do not 
dialogue, […] they can only negotiate” [“(L)es systèmes dogmatiques comme tels ne dialoguent pas, (…) ils ne 
peuvent que négocier”].
32  See eg LEIBNIZ, G. W. Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement. In: Die philosophischen Schriften von 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. vol. 5, C.I. Gerhardt (ed.). Hildesheim: Olms, 1965 [1764†]. p. 49: ‘[B]y virtue of 
imperceptible variations, two individual things [...] must always differ’ [‘(E)n vertu des variations insensibles, 
deux choses individuelles (...) doivent tousjours differer’].
33  GOODMAN, N. Seven Strictures on Similarity. In: Problems and Projects. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1972. 
p. 437.
34  DERRIDA, J. Mémoires. Paris: Galilée, 1988. p. 217 [“Première règle: le respect pour l’autre, c’est-à-dire pour 
son droit à la différence”].
35  DERRIDA, J. Le Monolinguisme de l’autre. Paris: Galilée 1996. p. 103 [“(L)a traduction est un autre nom de 
l’impossible”]. See also eg Ortega y Gasset (note 7), p. 431-52, passim.
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For example, one cannot say “vieux linge” in English in a manner that would convey 
the semantic extension of the French expression without any accretion or loss of 
significance along the way, that would be neither a little above or a little below the 
French language.36 Whatever English words the translator chooses, no matter how 
painstakingly he proceeds, the meaning of the English words in English will deviate 
from the meaning of the French words in French, if ever so slightly. In effect, “we are 
condemned not to total incomprehension nor to pure untranslatability, but to a work 
of translation which will never be accomplished”.37 
Consider the French statute prohibiting ostensible religious “tenues” in French 
public schools.38 While the range of English translations is extensive – I have in mind, 
inter alia, “garb”, “dress”, “attire”, “outfit”, “clothes”, or “apparel” – no English word offers a 
case of identical semantic correspondence with the French term. Such an isomorph (this 
is the technical designation that would indicate an exact correlation) is impossible, and 
the gammut of options points to the contingency inherent to the matter of translation 
– an indeterminacy that simply cannot be overcome, that remains unresolvable. Recall 
the epigraphs to this article. Rather than correctness or exactitude, there is inevitably 
some play or slack arising in every translation process so that the way of translation is as 
leeway and thus as misway, structurally, intrinsically, inevitably so. The source-text that 
obviously exists in advance of the translator, that is there without him and irrespective 
of him, thus stays out of his epistemic reach: it resists him and his interpretive forays, it 
keeps a secret from him. Since there is no possible identification between the translator 
and the text (the self cannot be the other),39 and because his translation only tells the 
36  I refer to Letter from S. Beckett to G. Devine in CRAIG, G. et al (eds.). The Letters of Samuel Beckett. vol. 3. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014 [16 February 1957]. p. 26. Beckett’s self-translation across French 
and English supplies endless illustrations of untranslatability. For instance, contemplate this passage from 
Beckett’s in French: “J’allais le voir, à l’asile. Je le prenais par la main et le traînais devant la fenêtre. Mais regarde! 
Là! Tout ce blé qui lève. Et là! Regarde! Les voiles des sardiniers! Toute cette beauté!”: BECKETT, S. Fin de partie. 
Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1957. p. 60-61. Now, envisage this excerpt from Beckett’s in English in BECKETT, S. 
Endgame. R. McDonald (ed.). London: Faber & Faber, 2009 [1958]. p. 28: “I used to go and see him, in the asylum. 
I’d take him by the hand and drag him to the window. Look! There! All that rising corn! And there! Look! The 
sails of the herring fleet! All that loveliness!”. For George Steiner, the prominent comparatist and literary critic, 
“[t]he transfer is flawless […]. Yet the differences in cadence, in tone, in association, are considerable”: STEINER, 
G. After Babel. 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 498. According to Steiner, “‘[t]hat rising corn’ 
and ‘ce blé qui lève’ speak of worlds different enough to allow the mind both space and wonder”: ibid. To 
appreciate Steiner’s point requires considerable perspicacity. But his insight is sound, and the difference he 
indicates is not a figment of his imagination. It is there, and what Steiner does is to ascribe meaningful existence 
to it through a process of elucidation. (Incidentally, what Steiner styles a “flawless” translation consists, in effect, 
in a transposition that features many semantic differences as Beckett rewrites the French text and transforms 
it into English.)
37  BENNINGTON, G.; DERRIDA, J.  Jacques Derrida. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991. p. 164 [“nous sommes 
condamnés, non pas à l’incompréhension totale, ni à l’intraduisibilité pure, mais à un travail de traduction qui 
ne sera jamais accompli”]. The words are Geoffrey Bennington’s.
38  Statute no 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, art 1.
39  Cf. DERRIDA, J. Fidélité à plus d’un. Cahiers Intersignes, Paris, vol. 13, p. 221-265, 1998. p. 226: “One does 
not have access to the here-now of the other” [“On n’a pas accès à l’ici-maintenant de l’autre”].
Mind the Gap! Translation of Foreign Law Is Not What You Think
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 3, p. 601-654, set./dez. 2021. 613
source-text as he apprehends it, the translation ultimately conveys only “his” reading 
of the text. Again, notwithstanding how hard the translator tries, how meticulous his 
work, the fact of the linguistic matter is that no English word will ever capture the full 
semantic ramifications of the French term “tenues”: “[T]here is something of the original 
text that no translation can touch”.40 Indeed, because “the [meaning] itself always slips 
away”,41 no integral restitution is possible and the translative debt cannot be acquitted. 
One more illustration of this epistemological predicament must suffice. 
In Kafka’s Die Verwandlung, Gregor Samsa finds himself having been 
transformed into “einem ungeheueren Ungeziefer”. Let us review some of the better-
known translations in English: “a gigantic insect” (E. and W. Muir, Vintage [Random 
House] 1933); “a monstrous vermin” (S. Corngold, Modern Library [Random House] 
1972 and J. Neugroschel, Scribners 1993); “an enormous bug” (S. Applebaum, Dover 
1996); “a horrible vermin” (D. Wyllie, Wisehouse 2002); “a gargantuan pest” (M.A. 
Roberts, Prestwick House 2005); “a monstrous cockroach” (M. Hofmann, Penguin 
2007); “some kind of monstrous vermin” (J. Crick, Oxford University Press 2009); and 
“some sort of monstrous insect” (S. Bernofsky, Norton 2014). It is, in fact, easy to think 
of other choices: “a gigantic vermin”; “a gigantic cockroach”; “a gigantic bedbug”; “a 
monstrous insect”; “a monstrous bedbug”; “some kind of monstrous insect”; “some kind 
of monstrous cockroach”; “an enormous insect”; “an enormous vermin”; “some sort of 
monstrous vermin”; and “some sort of monstrous cockroach”. Imagine also the long list 
of potential permutations if one substitutes words like “beetle”, “bug”, “pest”, “roach”, 
“wall-louse”, or “wiglouse” – an enumeration that cannot be pronounced closed for “[a] 
thousand possibilities will always remain open even as one understands something 
of that sentence that makes sense”.42 Not only, then, is “equivocity [...] in fact always 
irreducible”,43 but “translation changes completely the text”.44
No translation is definitive, then – which is why, for example, leading publishers 
regularly commission retranslations of famous works.45 In effect, “[t]he act of translation 
40  DERRIDA, J. Table ronde sur la traduction. In: LEVESQUE, C.; McDONALD, C.V. (eds.). L’Oreille de l’autre. 
Montréal: VLB Editeur, 1982. p. 152 [“[(I)l y a quelque chose du texte original qu’aucune traduction ne peut 
toucher”].
41  DERRIDA, J. La Voix et le phénomène. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967. p. 117 [“(Le sens) même 
se dérobe toujours”]. I substitute “sens” (“meaning”) for “chose” (“thing”).
42  DERRIDA, J. Limited Inc E. Weber (ed.). Paris: Galilée, 1990. p. 122 [“(m)ille possibilités resteront toujours 
ouvertes, alors même qu’on comprend quelque chose de cette phrase qui fait sens”].
43  DERRIDA, J. Introduction. In: HUSSERL, E. L’Origine de la géométrie (Der Ursprung der Geometrie) 
[1954†]. J. Derrida (transl.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. p. 106 [“l’équivocité (...) en fait toujours 
irréductible”].
44  DERRIDA, J.; FERRARIS, M. Le Goût du secret. A. Bellantone; A. Cohen (eds.). Paris: Hermann, 2018 [1994]. 
p. 84 [“(l)a traduction change totalement le texte”]. The words are Derrida’s. Cf. VENUTI, L. Translation Changes 
Everything. London: Routledge, 2013.
45  Illustrations abound. Eg: BEAUVOIR, S. de. The Second Sex. C. Borde; S. Malovany-Chevallier (transl.). 
London: Cape, 2009. The earlier translation was HM Parshley’s (Knopf 1953). Beauvoir’s Le Deuxième sexe 
appeared in 1949.
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[…] means living with difference and living with failure. It means acknowledging the 
co-equal incommensurables that separate us”.46 Appreciating that his translation 
is doomed to fail, that it is fated not to achieve duplication across languages, the 
translator’s challenge is effectively to “[f ]ail better”,47 that is, continually to seek to 
improve upon his always-already deficient translative effort.
Now, the fact that translation is impossible, that there is no ascertainable 
meaning of a text in translation that would be firm, settled, or permanent, evidently 
need not imply that translation must not be undertaken. Arguably, the case for the 
ineradicability of translation seems so evident that it is hardly worth discussing. I am 
therefore content to quote again George Steiner, who pithily captures the necessity 
of the translative enterprise by observing that “[w]ithout [translation], we would live 
in arrogant parishes bordered by silence” – a situation that must be unacceptable 
to any individual with the least intellectual sophistication.48 Even as translation is 
acknowledged to be impossible, then, no text must be deemed immune to translation.49 
Again, though, one must appreciate that when one proceeds to translate, one is, literally, 
performing the impossible, that is, one must realize that one’s endeavour is doomed to 
failure, that one is operating in “constant renunciation”.50 Not only is it important to have 
a keen awareness of the limits of one’s intellectual assignment, but I find that it is good 
to bring to bear a sense of modesty to one’s task – to say, with Derrida: “What guides me 
is always untranslatability”.51
Still, things are complicated for even as the translator must remain humble, 
he cannot forget (and others must not forget either) that his input is considerable. In 
effect, the translator also signs the author’s text. To be sure, it is not a joint signature 
so much as a counter-signature. If this expression evokes the idea that the translator 
would be counterfeiting the text, such resonance is etymologically apt, since the Latin 
“contra-facere” means “to make in opposing imitation, to make in contrast to imitation”. 
It is not, then, that the translator is opposing the source-text, but that his translation 
runs counter to the idea of imitation. Think also of the sentence, “She is my counterpart 
in New York”. On reflection, there is no suggestion in the word “counterpart” of any 
46  MAITLAND, S. What Is Cultural Translation? London: Bloomsbury, 2017. p. 8.
47  Beckett (note 1), p. 81.
48  STEINER, G. Introduction. In: STEINER, G. (ed.). The Penguin Book of Modern Verse Translation. London: 
Penguin, 1966. p. 25.
49  Indeed, Derrida suggests that a text is always-already making a request to be translated so as to ensure 
its survival. In other words, a translation would not arise as an accident that would advene to an already full 
substance, but would be responding to an initial limitation within the textual substance. Assuming the merit 
of this insight, can it be applied to law-texts? Does a (local) law-text desire its translation? See Derrida (note 40), 
p. 201-02.
50  GADAMER, H.-G. Wahrheit und Methode. 5th edn. Mohr Siebeck, 1986. p. 389-90.
51  DERRIDA, J. Du mot à la vie: un dialogue entre Jacques Derrida et Hélène Cixous (interview with A. Armel). 
Magazine littéraire, Paris, April 2004, p. 26 [“Ce qui me guide, c’est toujours l’intraductibilité”].
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antagonism or mimetism. Rather, one’s “counterpart” evokes the idea of an alter ego, 
of a second entity reminiscent of the initial one although different from it (since there 
is more than one, there must indeed be difference).52 As he responds to the text, the 
translator affirms it by extending its life beyond its language, by permitting it to live on 
– if differently – by conferring an “increase of being” to it.53
3  Translation features a constant tension between two supremacies, 
that of the translator over the text and that of the text over the 
translator. In the end, the text carries.
The translator must be aware that he wields great power over the text being translated. 
Indeed, his role deserves to be acknowledged well beyond the invisibility to which it 
has traditionally been confined – inasmuch as the view has long held that a translation 
must produce a text that does not seem to be translated in the first place, the abiding 
idea being that the less evident it is, the better the translation.54 However, the fact of 
the matter is that it makes all the difference whether Shakespeare’s translation into 
French is Pierre Leyris’s or Yves Bonnefoy’s – or, to return to my Beauvoir illustration, 
whether Le Deuxième sexe is Howard Parshley’s or Constance Borde’s translation into 
English. Again, this individual ascendancy is what the expression “counter-signature” 
purports to convey by insisting that the translator is also signing the text, if differently 
from its author. (Incidentally, time matters, too: the English that prevailed in Parshley’s 
era in the early 1950s is obviously not the English that governed in Borde’s moment in 
the 2010s. Sixty years hence, some English words are no longer current and accordingly 
terms that Borde would not consider deploying, while other formulations emerged in 
the intervening six decades that would therefore have been unknown to Parshley.) 
Still, even as I argue for the necessary recognition of the translator’s power – 
every individual translation is discriminative, decisive, and critical – I maintain that the 
text being translated acts as a kind of charter framing the translator’s autonomy. To 
52  I draw on DERRIDA, J. Contresignature (unpublished 2000), 44 pp. p. 30 [on file]. At this writing, Derrida’s 
essay remains inedited in its original version. I am grateful to Leslie Hill, University of Warwick, for supplying me 
with the French document. For a published English translation, see DERRIDA, J. Countersignature. M. Hanrahan 
(transl.). Paragraph, Edinburgh, vol. 27, n. 2, p. 7-42, 2004. Reflecting on the “counter-move”, Bernard Harcourt 
writes that “[n]either inherently good nor bad, it can go in multiple directions. It is not thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis. It is not anti-”: Harcourt (note 21), p. 202. He adds: “Counter can fail”: ibid.
53  Gadamer (note 50), p. 145 [“Zuwachs an Sein”]. For Walter Benjamin, translation indeed pertains to the 
“survival” (“Überleben”) or “afterlife” (“Fortleben”) of the source-text: BENJAMIN, W. Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers. 
In: BENJAMIN, W. Illuminationen – Ausgewählte Schriften. vol. 1, S. Unseld (ed.). Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1977 
[1923]. p. 51. It follows that “the original is a priori indebted with regard to the translation”: Derrida (note 40), p. 
201 [“l’original est a priori endetté à l’égard de la traduction”].
54  In the preface to the English version of his Rechtsvergleichung (note 20), Uwe Kischel states that he wanted 
“a translation that reads not like a translation”: KISCHEL, U. Comparative Law. A. Hammel (transl.). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. ix. See generally VENUTI, L. The Translator’s Invisibility. 3rd edn. London: 
Routledge, 2018.
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offer a provocative illustration, there is no way in which the word “tenues” in the French 
statute on religious attire in public schools could meaningfully be translated into English 
as “nuclear rockets”. Consider Derrida: “One does not do anything whatsoever with 
language”.55 There are the words that there are, there, and while a source-text can have 
more than one meaning it cannot have every meaning. What control the translator is in 
a position to exercise – and his authority is considerable – must therefore contend with 
the source-text’s words themselves. Since no translation is fully exempt from reference 
– every translation is a translation of something – the translator’s readerly sovereignty 
cannot be unconditional, at least if the exercise must be worthy of being designated 
a “translation”. For a translation to exist as a translation of a text, it must demonstrably 
engage with the text, with that text. If you will, there is a “going-along-in-understanding” 
that must be involved in the process of translating a text.56 In other terms, translation 
is re-presentation, a presentation anew of the primary text, an iteration. Arguably, it 
is not so much that the target-text is to be found vis-à-vis the source-text, but that 
the source-text inheres to the target-text: it is present within it. Envisage translation 
as giving effect to a deployment of inherence. Now, because translation is of a text 
and since – conventionally, at least – the source-text can only signify within a bounded 
semantic framework, when it comes to meaning it is the words of the source-text that 
have the last word. 
This textual preponderance – this resilience – has to do neither with anything 
like the essence of the inscribed source-words nor with any form of transcendental 
withstanding capturing the source-text. Rather, it concerns the way in which a given 
linguistic community has conventionally invested the relevant term – say, “tenues” – 
with a received semantic extension or an accepted meaning, often over the longue or 
très longue durée. Otherwise said, “[t]he meaning of an utterance [...] is its experience”.57 
There are therefore limits, or “built-in” conventional semantic constraints, to cabin how 
much the translator’s assertion of individual consciousness can strike an independent 
course from the social aspect of human understanding – which entails that there is 
no unlimited or infinite semiosis: “The words themselves block the way”.58 It follows 
that a translation can be impugned as an over-translation, at least as a conventionally 
inadmissible over-translation, that is, as a translation lying beyond what an original text 
55  DERRIDA, J. Apprendre à vivre enfin. J. Birnbaum (ed.). Paris: Galilée, 2005 [2004]. p. 38 [“On ne fait pas 
n’importe quoi avec la langue”]. Even as it shows itself to be remarkably open, language thus frames the extent 
of its own possible unfolding as it reveals “powers of coding or of overcoding, otherwise said, of control and of 
self-regulation”: Derrida (note 2), p. 354 [“pouvoirs de codage ou de surcodage, autrement dit de contrôle et 
d’autorégulation”].
56  GADAMER, H.-G. Hermeneutik auf der Spur. In: Gesammelte Werke. vol. 10. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995 
[1994]. p. 161 [“im Verstehen mitzugehen”].
57  FISH, S. Is There a Text in This Class? Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982. p. 65. 
58  HARTMAN, G. H. Saving the Text. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. p. 157.
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can legitimately be taken to mean at a certain time within an ascertainable linguistic 
constituency under any reasonably intelligible or persuasive view.59 
4  A translation is unavoidably autobiographical.
The idea that a translation would be neutral or impartial – that is, objective – is 
unsustainable. Rather, a translation must feature an input from the translator – from this 
particular translator – whose inclinations will prompt him, say, to translate “tenues” as 
“attire” rather than “apparel” (supra). Now, when a translator comes to the act of decision-
making, he simply cannot operate from a presuppositionless starting-point. Indeed, if 
every preconception or opinion, if every predisposition or bias, if every predilection or 
proclivity, were to be removed from the translator’s mind, there would be no intellectual 
equipment at the translator’s disposal with which to proceed to the determinations 
that he must make. Otherwise said, “[one] cannot possibly start with a clean slate and 
still be somebody capable of starting”.60 To iterate the point a little more philosophically, 
translation cannot be dissociated from the idea of a radical fore-structure – a rooted 
fore-structure – within which thought always-already dwells. In effect, translation 
necessarily projects itself out of that fore-structure. And it is the projective character 
of translation that inevitably delineates what possibilities will prove available or 
foreclosed to the specific translator. Projection, possibility, and translation are thus 
as empirically governed as they are inextricably entwined.  (Observe that it would be 
simplistic to reduce the fore-structure to pre-knowledge, since the instrumental nexus 
I discuss operates at a more primordial level still. For instance, it embodies all manner 
of emotions that inform translation even as they do not concern knowledge strictly 
understood.) 
To be sure, the autobiographical character of the decision to translate “tenues” 
by way of “attire” rather than “apparel” may not be apparent. But this is hardly a sufficient 
reason to dismiss the fact that the translator brings to bear his fore-structure on the 
decision to deem one English word more relevant than the other. Indeed, it simply 
cannot be the case that a translation is not inflected by autobiography for no translation 
59  Over-translation is a variation on the theme of over-interpretation. Note that even an advocate of over-
interpretation such as Jonathan Culler concedes that “meaning is context bound”: CULLER, J. In Defence of 
Overinterpretation. In: COLLINI, S. (ed.). Interpretation and Overinterpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. p. 120.
60  FISH, S. Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law. 
Cardozo Law Review, New York, vol. 29, n. 3, p. 1109-1146, 2008. p. 1135. Indeed, Heidegger goes so far as to 
claim that “[e]very disputation between different interpretations of a work, not only in philosophy, is in truth a 
mutual reflection relating to leading presuppositions; it is the discussion of these”: HEIDEGGER, M. Was heisst 
Denken? In: Gesamtausgabe. vol. 8, P.-L. Coriando (ed.). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2002 [1954]. p. 181 [“(j)ede 
Auseinandersetzung zwischen verschiedenen Interpretationen eines Werkes, nicht nur des philosophischen, 
ist in Wahrheit eine wechselseitige Besinnung auf die leitenden Voraussetzungen, ist die Erörterung dieser”].
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is ever immediate.61 Rather, a translation must be mediated through the translator’s 
experience: no translation can be dissociated from a translator’s commentary on the 
source-text – even if this narrative should be taking place sotto voce. Note that the 
integration between the translator’s self and the source-text runs deeper than co-
extension, which assumes separability, measurability, divisibility, or identifiability. 
It is not that selfhood and texthood parallel or succeed each other, but that they 
tessellate each other, that they mingle to the point of indissociability. Otherwise said, 
the translator proceeds to a selfing of the source-text. The translating self textualizes 
itself: it inscribes itself – it writes itself – into the source-text, it marks the text so 
that a translation is ultimately resolvable as a quest for the expressive self. It follows 
that there is no unrhetorical translation, rhetoric being the enabling condition of all 
articulate thought. “[A]s long as a translation remains a translation, […] it will always 
have a translator’s presence and therefore a translator’s subject position inscribed in it, 
however well hidden they may be”.62
I have been referring to the translator’s velleities. It is important to insist that 
these are not all strictly personal to him, that they are therefore not all at his free 
disposal to modify. The fact of the matter is that the translator has been thrown into 
a culture – a cultural complex – that has framed his world and his world-view and that 
he has made his, largely semi-consciously or even sub-consciously. And that culture, 
which he has incorporated and now embodies, is at once enabling and constraining: 
it provides the individual with tools allowing him to make sense of his world (again, 
think about language, which permits one to name or designate), but it also limits his 
horizons (an anglophone cannot spontaneously approach a chair as feminine and 
an armchair as masculine, while a francophone readily thinks of “la chaise” and “le 
fauteuil”). Within the autobiographical imprint, the fact of enculturation thus certainly 
occupies a certain place, even if it resists clear description. In effect, autobiography is 
also autoheterography.
I have been claiming that the translator affirms the text being translated. The 
point I am making at this juncture is that it is crucial not to lose sight of the fact that he 
affirms the text – he does, not someone else. That the ascribed meaning in translation 
should depend on the texture of the translator’s experience is another reason, then, for 
61  Cf. FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, Freud, Marx. In: Dits et écrits. vol 1, D. Defert; F. Ewald (eds.). Paris: Gallimard, 
1994 [1967]. p. 571: “There is never [...] an interpretandum that be not already interpretans, so much so that 
it is a relation as much of violence as of elucidation that establishes itself in interpretation” [“Il n’y a jamais 
(...) un interpretandum qui ne soit déjà interpretans, si bien que c’est un rapport tout autant de violence que 
d’élucidation qui s’établit dans l’interprétation”]. A translation – any translation – is, to be sure, an interpretation. 
See HEIDEGGER, M. Heraklit. In: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 55, M.S. Frings (ed.). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979 
[1943]. p. 63: “Interpretation and translation are at their essential core the same” [“Auslegung und Übersetzung 
sind in ihrem Wesenskern dasselbe”]. I read Heidegger to mean that there is a difference between the two 
intellectual processes – of course, there is – but that it is slight.
62  HERMANS, T. The Conference of the Tongues. London: Routledge, 2007. p. 27.
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the impossibility of a translation that would be exactly – isomorphically – ad idem with 
the source-text. The self cannot be the other. You cannot be the text you are translating.
5  A translation cannot be true (but it can be false). 
Because it deals in words, translation must belong to the realm of interpretation, and 
it cannot therefore concern the domain of truth – the two epistemic labels being 
mutually exclusive. By way of illustration, none of Kafka’s English translations that I 
have collected (supra) can reasonably warrant identification as the “true” translation 
of the German text (in the sense in which it would be the unique, uniquely fixed, 
uniquely stable, and uniquely acknowledged translation of Kafka’s). “Truth” is, in fact, 
as inapplicable to translation as would be the words “angry” or “loud” by reference to a 
blanket or a cucumber. In other terms, the search for truth is the pursuit of an imaginary 
goal thoroughly exogenous to the translative inquiry. 
Since to consider the various translations of “einem ungeheueren Ungeziefer” is 
to witness a conflict of interpretations, not only does no translation justify the ascription 
of the qualifier “true” to it, but no translation harbours an intrinsic entitlement to carry 
interpretively over its competitors. For instance, what could it mean that amongst all 
the published translations of Kafka’s, Michael Hofmann’s or Joyce Crick’s translation 
should find favour, say, with the largest number of tenured professors in what are, 
according to the US News & World Report’s 2022 rankings, the ten leading US universities 
offering graduate programmes in German Studies? The expression of such a preference 
by the constituency I identify – even as it is so easy to think of many other focus groups 
– can only suggest that the specific professors who were surveyed found one particular 
translation to be more persuasive to them than all the other attempts that had come 
to their attention by the time they were prompted. Indeed, I find it unbelievable that 
either Hofmann or Crick would ever think of his or her translation as true, while I fully 
accept how both translators would earnestly contend that their translation offers the 
best interpretive yield out of Kafka’s work, that it is doing Kafka’s text justice in a way 
that no other translation can quite match. (I appreciate that the late Ronald Dworkin 
thought otherwise, but I find myself unable to accept his view.63) And it is implausible 
63  According to Dworkin, “a scholar who labors for years over a new reading of Hamlet cannot believe that his 
various interpretive conclusions are no more valid than the contradictory conclusions of other scholars […] . 
[…] [I]f [interpreters] have come to think that one interpretation of something is best, they can also sensibly 
think that that interpretation meets the test of what defines success in the enterprise, even if they cannot 
articulate that test in much or any detail. So they can think there is objective truth in interpretation”: DWORKIN, 
R. Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. p. 151. I cannot see how Dworkin’s 
scholar is legitimately – and creditably – able to move from “sensibly think[ing] that [his] interpretation meets 
the test of what defines success in the enterprise” to “think[ing] [that] there is objective truth in interpretation”. 
For me, Dworkin’s conjunction (“So”) at the beginning of the last sentence of my quotation indeed heralds a 
non sequitur. While all of Kafka’s translators in English are presumably acting seriously and wish to be taken 
seriously, this sense of purpose, no matter how heightened, does not mean, need not mean, and must not 
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that such matters as the publisher’s reputation, the translator’s institutional affiliation, 
the translator’s fame, the reviews of a translation in high-profile literary journals or 
magazines, even a professor’s acquaintance or friendship with Hofmann or Crick, it is 
implausible, then, that such circumstances would have nothing whatsoever to do with 
the formulation of one’s preference. In sum, the fate of any given translation is tied 
to the manner in which it manages to convince or not, and persuasion involves the 
enmeshment of an infinitely complex array of facts, not all of them having to do with 
high-minded scholarship. At any rate, it is therefore crucial not to think of any translation 
you produce as being a candidate for elevation to the status of “true” translation. The 
only verity is variety. However, you must be careful that your translation is not regarded 
as false.
To be sure, falsehood is no more an objective matter than all other interpretive 
questions. Even the English translation of “tenues” as “nuclear rockets” cannot be said to 
be objectively false. However, in advance of empirical study, what can legitimately be 
expected is that reasonable interpreters will unanimously maintain that such an English 
translation completely fails to do justice to the French term – that it is, for all intents and 
purposes, well, false.64 Of course, unanimity does not objectivity make, and the issue 
of falsehood ultimately remains a matter of conventionality. (I insist that my remit is 
translation rather than, say, heliocentrism.)
The translator’s challenge, then, consists in occupying a locus that must be 
out-of-truth without being false. In passing, let me insist how it is indeed key that a 
translation ought to be ascertainable as false and thus open to fully-fledged interpretive 
disqualification. Any idea that translation would imply that “anything goes” – that “any 
translation goes” – or that the process could generate some translative “free-for-all”, 
any idea that the structural translative play there is could somehow become free play 
and countenance something like translative anarchy, must prove indefensible. Let me 
emphasize, too, that one does not need truth in order to be able to ascertain falsehood. 
Indeed, it cannot be that to declare “nuclear rockets” to be a false English-language 
reading of “tenues”, one requires to have discerned the true English-language reading 
of “tenues”. I cannot accept this binary analytics. Frankly, I find that there is banality to 
such binarity.
mean that any of these translators should hold his or her interpretation to be “true”. Again, what a translator 
requires to assume, and what his readership needs to accept about his work, is that his translation carries a 
higher interpretive yield than others. And, as regards any expression of conviction in the supremacy of one 
interpretation over others, the idea of “truth” is superfluous. Moreover, there would be no sense in talking 
about “truth for me”, since if one adds this codicil the word “truth” ultimately finds itself devoid of meaningful 
semantic import.
64  Considering the matter with specific reference to the issue of interpretation, Simon Blackburn rightly 
insists that “falsity can be detected for what it is”: BLACKBURN, S. On Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018. p. 126. But, unlike what Blackburn appears to imply (without offering any supporting argument), it does 
not follow that that there is truth-in-interpretation – or truth-in-translation.
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6  Translation is a second original.
The optimal way to acknowledge that a translation is an enactment, a performance, 
and that the translator is a mediator – to vindicate the fact that translation, even as it 
maintains semantic correlations and perhaps stylistic resonances with the source-text, 
does not involve the transfer of an invariant – is to recognize it as a second original 
(rather than as the first original in a second language).65 Translation is, perforce, an 
original creation – it is the first original, originally once more, if differently. Again, 
such difference obtains, because straightforward duplication across languages is 
beyond reach. Indeed, in Derrida’s words, “for the notion of translation, one will have 
to substitute a notion of transformation: the regulated transformation of a language 
by another, of a text by another”.66 He adds: “We will not have been and have not been 
involved ever, in fact, in some ‘transportation’ of pure signifieds that the signifying 
instrument – or the ‘vehicle’ – would leave virginal and unbroached, from one language 
to another”.67 Otherwise said, there can be “no transportation without transformation”.68 
Observe that while the translator is writing a second original, he is inscribing 
an original of a peculiar kind, since this second original is not fully autonomous: it is an 
original that must emanate from the first original, that must be of it. There is play, then, 
inevitably so, but – to repeat – there is not free play.69 Crucially, though, the idea of a 
second original assists in acknowledging the translator’s agency, in recognizing the fact 
65  There is (ancient) legal evidence to the effect that a translation qualifies as original work. Eg: Stowe v Thomas 
23 F Cas 201 (Circuit Court Eastern District Pa 1853), where an unauthorized German translation of Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) was said not to have infringed the author’s copyright in the 
English text. At 207, Grier J held that “[t]he same conceptions clothed in another language cannot constitute 
the same composition”. At ibid, the judge added, no doubt excessively, that “[t]o make a good translation 
of a work, often requires more learning, talent and judgment, than was required to write the original”. See 
also Byrne v Statist Co [1914] 1 KB 622, where Bailhache J held that a newspaper had infringed a translator’s 
copyright by publishing his translation without his permission. At 627, the judge held a translation to be an 
“original literary work”.
66  DERRIDA, J. Positions. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972. p. 31 [“à la notion de traduction, il faudra substituer 
une notion de transformation: transformation réglée d’une langue par une autre, d’un texte par un autre”].
67  ibid [“Nous n’aurons et n’avons en fait jamais eu affaire à quelque ‘transport’ de signifiés purs que 
l’instrument – ou le ‘véhicule’ – signifiant laisserait vierge et inentamé, d’une langue à l’autre”]. Cf. BELLOS, D; 
SCHEPPELE, K. L. Translating Law Across Cultures and Societies: A Conversation with David Bellos and Kim Lane 
Scheppele. In: MERTZ, E.; MACAULAY, S.; MITCHELL, T. W. (eds.). The New Legal Realism. vol. 1. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016. p. 286: “There is always something that changes in the course of translation 
because – you changed [the legal institution or legal idea] almost by definition when you moved it to a new 
place”. The words are Scheppele’s.
68  LATOUR, B. Aramis ou l’amour des techniques. Paris: La Découverte, 1992. p. 104 [“pas de transport sans 
transformation”].
69  Cf. BRIGGS, K. This Little Art. London: Fitzcarraldo, 2017. p. 338: “Some new thing starts to get made in 
the frame of againness; something that is of the original, yes, but that will extend beyond the reach of it, the 
purview of it, since it is being made by someone else, by me now”.
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that the translator is a writer in his own write and in his own re-write.70 To enunciate or 
enact a translation is to do something. A translator’s understanding is a “participating 
understanding”.71
A metaphorical excursus may help to change the idea of change that has 
traditionally governed translation – now to envisage change as a move away from the 
original form rather than as a (deficient) reformation of it, as a displacement rather than 
as “the project to return ‘strategically’, ideally, to an origin or to a ‘priority’ [that would 
be] simple, intact, normal, pure, proper, so as then to think [through] the derivation, 
the complication, the degradation, the accident”.72 The focus must no longer be on 
how the original finds itself distorted in the process of translation, but rather on the 
observation of the life that is displayed in the source-text’s becoming as it is seen to 
evolve epigenetically, that is, by way of a differentiation process known as “epigenesis”. 
If you will, one must appreciate that “lost in translation’ is but a “tedious old saying”;73 
instead, one requires to ponder Borges: “The original is unfaithful to the translation”.74 
But I must address elasticity and plasticity.
While different degrees of desirable, allowable, or feasible stretch can be 
envisaged, elasticity ultimately privileges the original starting-point. In the end, 
whatever change takes place in the shape of the elastic entity purports to revert to 
the initial form. Although the original form may have been de-formed, it finds itself 
being re-formed. Elasticity thus refers to an appearance of change only. Contrariwise, 
plasticity (as in sculpting or modelling or, beyond hard and malleable materials, as in 
plastic surgery) is about giving new form: it is about change, too, but it concerns the 
kind of change that breaks free of the initial structure. All equivalence-based theories 
of translation (and their deference to the original as something, in effect, along the 
lines of an immutable essence) fit the elasticity paradigm. If you will, elasticity refers 
to an economy of exchange, where one form is constantly re-formed. To be sure, the 
external appearance of the source-text may change (say, from French to English), but 
the substance of the form, if I can put the matter this way, is meant not to change. It 
is thus the source-text that delineates the condition of possibility of translation (how 
thin can the elastic stretch). And when the elastic breaks, there is promptly heard the 
70  Cf Derrida (note 40), p. 202: “Translation is a writing, [...] it is a productive writing” [“La traduction est une 
écriture, (...) c’est une écriture productive”].
71  BULTMANN, R. Das Problem der Hermeneutik. Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen, vol. 47, 
p. 47-69, 1950. p. 56 [“teilnehmende(s) Verstehen”].
72  Derrida (note 42), p. 174 [“le projet de remonter ‘stratégiquement’, idéalement, à une origine ou à 
une ‘priorité’ simple, intacte, normale, pure, propre, pour penser ensuite la dérivation, la complication, la 
dégradation, l’accident”].
73  FLOTOW, L. von. Translating Women. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011. p. 9.
74  BORGES, J. L. Sobre el Vathek de William Bedford. In: Otras inquisiciones. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1997 
[1952]. p. 207 [“El original es infiel a la traducción”].
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discourse of loss (think “lost in translation”). Plasticity, for its part, refers to an alternative 
economy. Since there is the marble block and, later, the sculpture, the block does not act 
as a fixed referent determining the sculpture. Indeed, there is no identity between the 
marble block and the sculpture. Likewise, there is no identity between the source-text 
and the target-text. Rather, there is more than one text, that is, there is transformation. 
Of course, there are limits to the plasticity of plasticity, and one cannot do whatever one 
wants – whether with the marble block or the source-text.75
7  Failure to translate is an opportunity.
Once it is established that translation cannot legitimately aspire to truth (supra), once 
the insurmountable recalcitrance of the source-text is acknowledged (supra), it might 
be tempting for the translator to lose faith in the endeavour and perhaps renounce the 
enterprise altogether. But such defeatism would be grievously mistaken. Indeed, the 
fact that every translation will necessarily fall short of exactitude or correctness, the fact 
that it will inevitably not find itself ad idem with the source-text on account of the latter’s 
infinite meaningfulness, the fact that textual intricacy lies beyond what the translator 
can see and beyond what he can tell in his language (meaning is unsaturable), the 
fact that the source-text will therefore inevitably keep a secret from the translator, no 
matter how meticulous or painstaking the translation, all these circumstances present 
a signal interpretive opportunity. 
On account of what is, in effect, a structural misunderstanding – the way in 
which the act of translation is structured means that there must be an interpretive 
gap between the source-text and the target-text, howsoever intrinsically excellent the 
translation76 – there can potentially arise a multiplicity of translations. Every single one 
of these translations will obligatorily be “disadjusted” vis-à-vis the source-text, if ever so 
75  I draw on Carolyn Shread who, reflecting on her own work as Catherine Malabou’s translator into English, 
applies to translation studies Malabou’s distinction between “elasticity” and “plasticity”. Eg: SHREAD, C. Une 
intelligence autre: Reception Plasticity and the Melancholy of the Translated Author. Palimpsestes, Paris, 
n. 33, p. 92-101, 2019; SHREAD, C. The Horror of Translation. theory@buffalo, Buffalo, vol. 16, p. 77-95, 2012; 
SHREAD, C. Catherine Malabou’s Plasticity in Translation. TTR: Traduction, terminologie, rédaction, Montréal, 
vol. 24, n. 1, p. 125-148, 2011. For Malabou’s principal philosophical work with respect to this distinction, see 
MALABOU, C. La Plasticité au soir de l’écriture. Paris: Scheer, 2005; MALABOU, C. Le Change Heidegger. 
Paris: Scheer, 2004; MALABOU, C. L’Avenir de Hegel. Paris: Vrin, 2000. Malabou explains that she owes the 
concept of plasticity to Hegel. See HEGEL, G. W. F. Wissenschaft der Logik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986 [1832]. 
p. 30-31 and 33. I refer specifically to the preface to the second edition, which was written in 1831. There are 
other Hegel texts that are also relevant. For instance, Hegel mentions “elasticity” (“Elastizität”) in HEGEL, G. W. F. 
Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986 [1807]. p. 204, 383, and 532. The value of Malabou’s 
insight stands apart from her wider claim that writing is becoming irrelevant and being replaced by plasticity 
as a new paradigm for thought – which I regard as an exaggeration that need not detain me.
76  Cf. STEINER, G. No Passion Spent. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. p. 152, who refers to “the failures 
or incompletions of even the finest of translations”.
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slightly.77 Indeed, no translation can legitimately claim to be the source-text’s exclusive 
voice in the target-language, and every translation heralds the choice of a certain 
infidelity. And the multiplicity of translations reveals the extent of the potentialities 
that inhere to the source-text and thus affords the occasion for further deliberation 
both about the equivocal meaning of the source-text and the semantic extension of 
the various contingencies on offer in the target-language. It is good that the sentence 
“Aujourd’hui, maman est morte”, Albert Camus’s famous incipit in his novel L’Etranger, 
should have been translated as “Mother died today” (S. Gilbert, Vintage [Random 
House] 1946); as “Maman died today” (M. Ward, Vintage [Random House] 1989); and as 
“My mother died today” (S. Smith, Penguin 2012): “[O]n one side, the singular, the text, 
the origins, and on the other, the plural, the variations, the derivatives”.78 
It is these variations – these iterations, these repetitions with a difference – that 
allow for the kind of investigation probing the meaning of Camus’s term (“maman”) 
and also the meanings of the different proposed corollaries in translation (“Mother”; 
“Maman”; “My mother”).79 Such inquiry may indeed invite a further translation, such as 
“Today, Maman died”.80 Still, what is said in translation is structurally “missaid” (I refer, 
once more, to this article’s epigraphs). Along the way, the plurality of translations that 
I discuss offers a further confirmation of the source-text’s untranslatability. Now, this 
predicament entails that “[the] search for meaning should not be abandoned but 
rather intensified”.81 Contrariwise, if one translation and one translation only were to 
be identified as the true, exact, or correct one, this move would bring any conversation 
to an abrupt end. Ultimately, “an interpretation without failure, an understanding 
by the self totally adequate […] would render everything impossible, both the event 
and the advent of the other, the advent to the other”.82 Yes. If the truth had indeed 
been proclaimed, what else would there be to say? What discussion would such a very 
repressive motion leave possible?
77  DERRIDA, J. Spectres de Marx. Paris: Galilée, 1993. p. 43 [“désajustées”].
78  BANU, G. Aujourd’hui, je traduis du grec. In: MUHLEISEN, L. (ed.). Antoine Vitez, le devoir de traduire. 
2nd edn. Arles: Actes Sud, 2017. p. 38-39 [“(D)’un côté le singulier, le texte, l’origine, et de l’autre, le pluriel, les 
variantes, les dérivés”].
79  Cf. XIE, M. Conditions of Comparison. London: Bloomsbury, 2011. p. 161: “We cannot underestimate the 
fact that not-understanding and mis-understanding also produce knowledge”.
80  BLOOM, R. Lost in Translation: What the First Line of “The Stranger” Should Be. The New Yorker, 
“Page-Turner” Blog, 11 May 2012. Available at: <https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/lost-in-
translation-what-the-first-line-of-the-stranger-should-be> [on file]. See also MESSUD, C. A New “L’Etranger”. 
The New York Review of Books, New York, 5 June 2014, p. 6 [on file]. For a detailed examination of the fate of 
Camus’s incipit in English with specific reference to the lessons that comparative law can usefully derive from 
disagreement amongst translators, see GLANERT, S. “Aujourd’hui, maman est morte”: traduction littéraire et 
droit comparé. Revue droit & littérature, Paris, n. 4, p. 373-389, 2020.
81  GASCHÉ, R. The Tain of the Mirror. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 266.
82  DERRIDA, J. Papier Machine. Paris: Galilée 2001. p. 306-07 [“une interprétation sans défaut, une 
compréhension de soi totalement adéquate (...) rendrai(t) tout impossible, et l’événement et la venue de l’autre, 
la venue à l’autre”].
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8  Hearken to the source-text.
As you proceed, it is incumbent upon you to be attentive, listening, receptive, hearken-
ing, to be lending an ear to the claims of the source-text. In other words, the translator 
must not be all intervention. As regards the heeding disposition, it is the source-text’s 
wording that matters – and it is the source-text’s wording that the translator must con-
sider. I emphasize that the translator’s focus ought to be on the source-text’s wording 
– that is, on the words and on the discursive traces they conceal, that lurk between the 
lines, that are encrypted within the textual fabric83 – and certainly not on anything like 
the author’s intention. Indeed, I reject the idea that words can even “carry” intentions 
so that they could be perfectly homogeneous vis-à-vis what wanted to be expressed, 
so that the scripted deed could match the wish. Even if there should be such correla-
tion, which I dispute, I also refute the idea that this expression of intention could ever 
become reliably known to a translator and then ever be loyally constructed or recon-
structed by a translator operating in his own words. Of course, I accept that “[a]ll texts 
lay out desires”,84 which means that I have no difficulty with the idea of the source-text 
as a volitional product in the sense, at least, that it exists as the outcome of a range of 
lexicographical choices and, indeed, as a form of willed communication. But the fact 
that there can be no intentionless text does not entail that intention ought to guide 
ascription of meaning in translation. In fact, my thesis is that intention, even assuming 
its expressibility and knowability and constructibility through the translator’s words, 
cannot govern the translation of texts. 
Intentionalism assumes that the past can be ascertained “as it really was”, that 
one can transcend one’s translative horizon and somehow return to the moment of 
creation of meaning by the author of a source-text. Now, this premiss can only pertain 
to fantasy, and the benchmark of the author’s intention therefore supply but illusory 
normativity. In the lucid words of literary critics William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, 
“the design or intention of the author is [...] no[t] available”.85 To invoke further literary 
criticism, Derek Attridge’s decisive formulation holds that “there is no possibility of a 
recourse to anything like an intention ‘itself’”.86 Meanwhile, Edward Hirsch aptly reminds 
one that “we have no direct access to the author’s mind”.87 Hence, Northrop Frye’s 
dispiritment as he famously called intention “[o]ne of the many slovenly illiteracies 
83  For a discussion of tracing as a primordial interpretive strategy within comparative law, see LEGRAND, P. 
Siting Foreign Law: How Derrida Can Help. Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Durham, v. 21, 
n. 3, p. 595-630, 2011.
84  SPIVAK, G. C. Readings. Kolkata: Seagull Books, 2014. p. 136.
85  WIMSATT, W. K.; BEARSLEY, M. C. The Intentional Fallacy. Sewanee Review, Baltimore, v. 54, n. 3, p. 468-488, 
1946. p. 468.
86  ATTRIDGE, D. The Singularity of Literature. London: Routledge, 2004. p. 101.
87  HIRSCH, E. D. Validity in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. p. 99.
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that the absence of systematic criticism has allowed to grow up”.88 It follows that a 
translator can only ever hope to win the persuasion game if, “in the explicit listening 
to the discourse of the other”,89 he can convincingly point to the words of the text, not 
to any intention allegedly informing the writing. Intention simply cannot supply the 
touchstone of translation, and it cannot act as a limit to translation either. 
9 Recognize (and challenge) the injustices pertaining to published 
translations.
It can be tempting to draw on a published translation – especially if such text has 
been released under a leading academic press’s imprint. Although I appreciate that 
this standard can readily prove impractical to uphold, you should always verify the 
published translation against the source-text before mobilizing it – possibly with the 
assistance of someone conversant in the source-language if you yourself are not. After 
all, why would you rely on the published translator’s interpretation of the source-text 
(the fact that the translation appears under a famous publishing imprint changing 
nothing to the suspicion you ought to be harbouring)? In most cases, this published 
translator will be unknown to you as will be the circumstances pursuant to which the 
translation was conducted. For example, one of Derrida’s most famous translators into 
English has written how, at some point, it was felt to have become important to translate 
Derrida’s work in a hurry – a fact that you yourself would not realize as you proceed 
to commit trust in a given translation.90 (If one were not minded to remain charitable, 
it would be easy to add that the concern for swiftness I mention is, regrettably, on 
full display in many English translations of Derrida’s texts.) An excellent illustration 
of the difficulty I address concerns the translation of Derrida’s “jeu” in the published 
proceedings of his prominent contribution to the celebrated 1966 Johns Hopkins 
conference on structuralism not as “play”, but as “free play”.91 The implications of this 
injustice to the French source-text have proven hugely consequential concerning both 
Derrida’s reputation as a philosopher and the fate of deconstruction, the term that 
came to designate his philosophical project. By ricochet, so to speak, the consequences 
I address also affect comparative law. Consider this account of the matter.
While Derrida’s French text, “La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des 
sciences humaines”, argues that the very point of the idea of “structure” in philosophy 
88  FRYE, N. Anatomy of Criticism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. p. 57.
89  HEIDEGGER, M. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001 [1927]. p. 164 [“im ausdrücklichen Hören der 
Rede des Anderen”].
90  See KAMUF, P. Traduire dans l’urgence. Magazine littéraire, Paris, April 2004. p. 49.
91  For a recension of the basic facts concerning this matter, see NEALON, J. T. Deconstruction and the Yale 
School of Literary Theory. In: SCHRIFT, A. D. (ed.). Poststructuralism and Critical Theory’s Second Generation. 
London: Routledge, 2014. p. 389-90.
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and anthropology (for instance, in the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss) has been to try 
and limit “the play of the structure” (“le jeu de la structure”), it maintains that such 
play is effectively inherent to every structure and that it is therefore uneliminable.92 
Derrida’s contention is momentous, which I can show by making reference to a long-
standing controversy within comparative law. I begin with James Gordley, an erudite 
comparatist, who tells us that as regards liability for bodily harm or the sale of defective 
goods, the law is “much the same” in, inter alia, Montpellier, Tucson, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, and 
Jakarta.93 Meanwhile, Alan Watson, in his Society and Legal Change, offers a statement 
that well encapsulates his views on legal dissemination: “Visigothic Spain, parts of 
post-mediaeval Germany and nineteenth century California could accept for a variety 
of reasons what is basically the same régime of matrimonial property”.94 I suggest 
that Gordley and Watson are effectively maintaining the existence (or the reality) of 
structures in law. They are saying, if you will, that there are embedded within various 
legal cultures an array of basic concepts literally structuring the law, structuring each 
law, wherever. Think of contract, ownership, and such like. And these structures are 
“much the same” (Gordley) or “basically the same” (Watson) in various locations. Every 
comparatist will have discerned the theory of so-called “legal transplants”.
For discussion’s sake, let me concede that there are indeed structures like 
“contract” and others, and let me further concede that these structures are recognizably 
present in a wide range of contemporary legal cultures. Now, my concessions that 
there are these ascertainable structures across laws does not compel me to the further 
concession that when one is considering a structure as it has established itself, say, 
in Slovenia and Portugal, one is then dealing in identity or in near-identity. There are, 
in fact, a number of points of entry into my objection to the argument from “legal 
transplants”, but I propose to emphasize one pathway only – and to deploy Derrida’s 
critique in the process.
Let us return to Constantinople, if briefly! The “Roman” conception of “contractus” 
as it existed in the sixth century was not some free-floating affair. In advance of empirical 
study, I hold that this “contractus” would very much have been a grounded conceptual 
entity with all manner of singular features that would have been informed by whatever 
were the concerns of the jurisconsults of the day – whether these preoccupations 
pertained to analytics, ideology, or what not. Now, irrespective of the “Roman” 
understanding of “contractus”, it is inconceivable that that ascertainable structure (I 
am upholding my concessions!) would have moved by itself from Constantinople to 
northern Italy or elsewhere. Indeed, for that displacement to have occurred, someone 
92  DERRIDA, J. L’Ecriture et la différence. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967. p. 409 and 426-28. 
93  GORDLEY, J. The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991. p. 1.
94  WATSON, A. Society and Legal Change. 2nd edn. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001. p. 110.
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would have had to take hold of “contractus” and dislocate it. Concretely speaking, 
someone would have had to write about “contractus” in northern Italy or teach it there 
and have advocated for its local relevance, perhaps under another label derived from a 
local language. And that move to northern Italy would ultimately have been prompted 
by desire. In other words, the mover would have had his motives, his ambitions – 
there would have been the mover’s striving informing the move. And then, at some 
later point in time, the structure would have moved from northern Italy to the south 
of France on account of someone having undertaken that displacement for his own 
reasons. That is, someone in the south of France would have written or spoken about 
northern Italian/“Roman” “contractus” and would have suggested its relevance to the 
south of France. And then, the structure would have moved from the south of France to 
Strasbourg, possibly at the behest of a jurist like Du Moulin (1500-66), who would have 
heralded its virtues for the benefit of local law. And so forth!
My basic point – and Derrida’s – is that, strictly speaking, although the structure 
is in motion and affixing itself locally in various locales along the merry way, it is 
never, strictly speaking, duplicating itself. Despite what appearances may suggest, 
a transformation of the structure will have been taking place every time it will have 
“landed” somewhere – so that there is, in all rigour, no “transplant” at all – this term 
very much consisting of a metaphorical fallacy. For example, the transformation 
may have happened, because in the local language the word for “contractus” carried 
a different semantic extension than the one it harboured in the language whence it 
came. It could also be that the concept’s local interpreters – say, judges or doctrinal 
writers – assigned a different meaning to the term. Be that as it may, there cannot not 
have been a transformation – or so I contend (in line with Derrida). To draw once more 
on Bruno Latour, if there is transportation, there must be transformation.95 Therefore, 
one can say that what there is, what takes place each and every time, is repetition with 
a transformation (which is, in effect, loose language, since if scrupulous expression be 
upheld, what appears is not a repetition, but an iteration, a repetition with a difference). 
Again, every implementation of the structure carries with it a transformation of the 
structure. Otherwise said, that transformation, that change, is at once necessary and 
inevitable. 
The claim regarding “necessity” is more philosophical, and it goes back to 
Leibniz’s Law (supra). So, if there is more than one instance of “contractus” – say, the 
one in Constantinople, the further one in northern Italy, the other one in the south of 
France, and the additional one in Strasbourg – there is necessarily difference across 
these various instantiations of the structure. Once more, the differend could have to 
do with local language, local interpretation, or local anything. The contention about 
95  Supra (note 68).
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“inevitability” is more sociological. For the structure to be able to embed itself in a new 
legal/cultural environment, that is, for the structure to “work” in its new place, it must 
go “local” in some meaningful way or other. It must adapt to local circumstances. There 
must be a “fit”. On account of the necessity and inevitability that I mention, no matter 
how structural a structure happens to be, there must be found within any structure 
an in-built mechanism allowing for its “reproduction” outside of the framework of 
identity – permitting its iteration. When Gordley and Watson claim that the law is “much 
the same” or “basically the same” in different places, they are minimizing somewhat 
dramatically the local colour that the legal unavoidably assumes – and must inevitably 
assume.
What I maintain – and this is very much Derrida’s claim – is that a structure, 
no matter how profoundly structural, must feature some in-built latitude or intrinsic 
lee-way allowing for its peripatetics and making it possible for it to acquire the local 
colour that will allow it to “match” locally – that is, to enable its iteration. It is this lee-way 
that Derrida calls “jeu”. In French, in this specific context, “jeu” means “movement” as in 
“There is abnormal play in the steering wheel” or “The nail on which you plan to hang 
your picture is loose. There is too much play there. The nail needs to be solidified”. But 
Derrida’s deployment of “jeu” is even more subtle for the word also refers to the proper 
operation of something as in “Because of the oblique axis of the Earth, we get the play 
of seasons” (“le jeu des saisons”). In sum – and to return to “contractus” – even if there is 
a structure, it must be the case that the iterative deployment of the structure features 
lee-way. 
Now, Derrida’s English translators, instead of straightforwardly inscribing the 
word “play” to account for the French “jeu”, used “free play” thereby forsaking the two 
intimations that Derrida had sought to suggest.96 Worse, “free play” evokes a kind of 
interpretive latitude effectively bordering on anarchy that fuelled the critique of Derrida 
and of deconstruction as lacking any sense of interpretive restraint and as entrusting 
interpreters with the legitimacy to do whatever they wanted with the text having come 
their way. Rightly, Derrida expressly complained about this injustice to himself and to 
his work.97 
Another example of the danger attendant upon reliance on published 
translations must also be of interest to translators. This further illustration involves 
three texts: Fredric Jameson’s The Prison-House of Language,98 Erich Heller’s The Artist’s 
96  DERRIDA, J. Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. In: MACKSEY, R.; DONATO, E. 
(eds.). The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. 
p. 247-48.
97  See Derrida (note 35), p. 209.
98  JAMESON, F. The Prison-House of Language. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 
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Journey Into the Interior,99 and Nietzsche’s Nachlass.100 Having emigrated from the Czech 
Republic, where he was born in 1911, Heller became a foremost British literary critic 
with a particular interest in German literature and philosophy. After teaching in England 
for a number of years, he moved to Chicago and settled at Northwestern University 
as of 1960 for the last twenty years of his career or so. Heller’s essays on Nietzsche 
earned him much critical acclaim in his life-time and continue to be widely regarded 
as authoritative. In The Artist’s Journey Into the Interior, Heller quotes and translates 
Nietzsche into English as referring to “the prison-house of language”.101 Heller’s source 
is the Musarion edition of Nietzsche’s complete works, the German text reading “de[r] 
sprachlich[e] Zwan[g]”.102 Since these words translate straightforwardly as “the linguistic 
constraint” – the standard English translation, Walter Kaufmann’s, has “the constraint 
of language”103 – it is quite unclear why Heller opted for the term “prison-house”. It is 
not that the expression had never been used in philosophy. Indeed, the same year 
that Heller published his translation, Adorno mentioned “the prison of language” 
(“Gefängnis der Sprache”) in his own work.104 But while Adorno may have used the 
carceral metaphor, Nietzsche did not. And when Jameson, a prominent literary critic 
and philosopher in his own right, attributes the expression “prison-house” to Nietzsche, 
which he does in the very epigraph to his book, even as Nietzsche himself only ever 
employed the much looser term “constraint”, he is effectively distorting Nietzsche’s 
thought. While “constraint” is not a true translation of “Zwang” (“fetter”, “restriction”, or 
“impediment” might also have done justice to the German term), “prison-house” is a 
false one – an example of “translation-as-violation”.105
And why would such a seasoned writer like Jameson proceed to misstate 
Nietzsche?106 The answer appears to be quite simply that Jameson took Heller’s 
99  HELLER, E. The Artist’s Journey Into the Interior. New York: Random House, 1965.
100  For the authoritative edition, see NIETZSCHE, F. Nachgelassene Fragmente. In: Digitale Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe. G. Colli; M. Montinari; P. D’Iorio (eds.). 2009 [1886-87]. <http://www.nietzschesource.org/
eKGWB/index#eKGWB/NF-1886,5> 5 [22].
101  Heller (note 99), p. 219. The relevant passage appears in italics. It is from an essay entitled “Wittgenstein and 
Nietzsche” first published in 1959 as HELLER, E. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Encounter, London, n. 72, p. 40-47, 1959. 
p. 46.
102  NIETZSCHE, F. Friedrich Nietzsche Gesammelte Werke. vol. 19, R. Oehler et al (eds.). Basel: Musarion, 
1926. p. 34. The phrase is in italics. 
103  NIETZSCHE, F. The Will to Power. W. Kaufmann; R.J. Hollingdale (transl.). New York: Random House, 
1968. §522, p. 283. Assembled by Nietzsche’s sister immediately after the philosopher’s death in 1900, in all 
likelihood out of self-interest, The Will to Power (Der Wille zur Macht) is a collection of reflections liberally lifted 
from unpublished notebooks. See generally DIETHE, C. Nietzsche’s Sister and the Will to Power. Champaign: 
University of Illinois Press, 2003.
104  ADORNO, T. W. Metaphysik. R. Tiedemann (ed.). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998 [1965]. p. 107.
105  SPIVAK, G. C. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. p. 162.
106  Jameson’s inaccuracy misled later writers. Eg: MILLER, J. H. The Critic as Host. In: BLOOM, H. et al. 
Deconstruction and Criticism. London: Continuum, 1979. p. 188.
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published translation for granted without making the effort to verify the German source-
text for himself – a startling omission, a particularly strange oversight as regards one’s 
epigraph.107 Strictly speaking, I am operating in the realm of interpretation for there is 
no hard evidence that Jameson drew on Heller. Specifically, the name “Heller” appears 
neither in Jameson’s bibliography nor in his index. But Jameson’s epigraph, which 
consists of thirty-seven words, is identical to Heller’s translation, which is itself unique. 
Given that Heller released his translation but a few years before Jameson published his 
essay and because of the convergence of intellectual interests between the two writers 
– not to repeat the fact of Heller’s critical renown – no reasonable explanation other 
than copy-and-paste appears to stand. To be sure, the substantive pertinence of the 
carceral metaphor remains open to discussion.108 But my point is that Nietzsche himself 
did not use it, contrary to what Jameson asserts on account of his lazy reliance on a 
published translation aptly said to be “quite misleading” and “very loose”.109
These two case-studies show that it can be very risky to take a published 
translation on trust, even if it should have been released under the auspices of a 
leading academic press or produced by a leading critic. In the two instances I discuss, 
the published English translation does not do justice to the source-text: it distorts it. A 
further example amongst a seemingly endless series of cases that I have encountered 
over the years emphasizes the seriousness of the issue, underscores how published 
translations can prove unjust vis-à-vis the source-text, and serves an additional warning 
to comparatists. Arguably, the following passage, of considerable interest for any 
theoretical reflection on translation, is one of the most important statements in Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode, a book ascertainably considered as a foremost 
twentieth-century philosophical text: “Es genügt zu sagen, daß man anders versteht, 
wenn man überhaupt versteht”.110 I suggest that a just English translation might read 
thus: “It suffices to say that one understands differently, when one understands at all”. As 
107  For critique, see LOVEKIN, D. Technique, Discourse, and Consciousness. Bethlehem: Lehigh University 
Press, 1991. p. 209; BEHLER, E. Translating Nietzsche in the United States: Critical Observations on The Complete 
Works of Friedrich Nietzsche. In: MUELLER-VOLLMER, K.; IRMSCHER, M. (eds.). Translating Literatures Translat-
ing Cultures. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998. p. 142-43.
108  Eg: APTER, E. The Prison-House of Translation? Carceral Models, Translational Turns. Diacritics, Baltimore, 
v. 47, n. 4, p. 50-79, 2019. p. 56-58.
109  Behler (note 107), p. 142. It is ironical that on the very same page where Heller daringly coins “prison-
house”, he chastises a translator of Wittgenstein’s for having “use[d] ‘language-game’ where the German is 
simply ‘Sprache’”: Heller (note 99), p. 219.
110  Gadamer (note 50), p. 302. For the significance of Gadamer’s thought, see eg WARNKE, G. (ed.). Inheriting 
Gadamer. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016; MALPAS, J.; ZABALA, S. (eds.). Consequences of 
Hermeneutics: Fifty Years After Gadamer’s Truth and Method. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2010; KRAJEWSKI, B. (ed.). Gadamer’s Repercussions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004; MALPAS, 
J.; ARNSWALD, U.; KERTSCHER, J. (eds.). Gadamer’s Century. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002; HAHN, L. E. (ed.). The 
Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Chicago: Open Court, 1996. Out of a plethoric bibliography, I limit this 
list to noteworthy collections of essays in English.
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I see it, Gadamer’s German sentence translates into English rather straightforwardly, 
in fact. Indeed, this exercise calls for one observation only, which concerns the term 
“überhaupt”, a word featuring a wide semantic reach. Here, it appears to me that 
“überhaupt” means “at all” as in the sentence “Er hat überhaupt keine Ahnung”, or “He 
has no idea at all”. Forwardness notwithstanding, the published French translation is 
unjust vis-à-vis the German original. It reads as follows: “Il suffit de dire que, dès que 
l’on comprend, on comprend autrement”.111 Leaving to one side the fact that the French 
translators invert the two relevant passages in Gadamer’s sentence and italicize both 
occurrences of the German verb “verstehen”, even as Gadamer does so once only, the 
French passage somewhat strikingly distorts Gadamer’s text. For Gadamer, whether 
there will ever be understanding remains doubtful. “[W]hen one understands at all”, he 
writes, which means “if ever one manages to understand in the first place”, then, he says, 
but only then, understanding will operate differently (say, from other understandings 
and from the text being understood). In other words, Gadamer distinguishes between 
two sets of situations, one habitual and the other exceptional. For him, there are 
the usual instances, which is when there will be no understanding whatsoever, and 
there are the less ordinary cases, which is when there will be understanding. And it is 
specifically the latter occasions that hold Gadamer’s interest (which makes sense, since 
there is not so much to say about configurations where no understanding whatsoever 
arises). And what are the implications of the understanding that will materialize in the 
situations where there is to be understanding? For Gadamer, such understanding will, 
perforce, operate singularly. However, the French text assumes that there will always 
be understanding along the way, that understanding will always emerge at some point 
– which is what the preposition “dès” indicates. A literal translation of the published 
French translation into English might read as follows: “It suffices to say that as soon as 
one understands, one understands differently”. For Gadamer, again, in most occurrences 
the moment of understanding will not even come to pass. Here, the French translation 
ignores the German “überhaupt” in a way that is unjust to Gadamer’s text. Meanwhile, a 
just French translation might have rendered “überhaupt” by “si jamais” so as to read: “Il 
suffit de dire qu’on comprend autrement, si jamais l’on comprend”.
For its part, the Italian text is likewise problematic, and it also does an injustice 
to Gadamer’s writing in one significant respect – it also distorts Gadamer’s work. In 
Italian, Gadamer’s enunciation reads thus: “È sufficiente dire che, quando in generale 
si comprende, si comprende diversamente”.112 Now, the Italian formulation “quando in 
generale si comprende, si comprende diversamente” can be transposed into English as 
111  GADAMER, H.-G. Vérité et méthode. P. Fruchon; G. Merlio; J. Grondin (transl.). Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996. 
p. 318.
112  GADAMER, H.-G. Verità e metodo. G. Vattimo (transl.). Milano: Bompiani, 2019 [2000]. p. 615.
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“when one understands in general, one understands differently”. Once more overlooking 
the inversion, the objectionable terms are obviously the words “in general”, which are 
nowhere to be found in Gadamer’s text. Here, the German “überhaupt” is misunderstood 
in a way that is unjust to Gadamer’s text.
It is, I think, relevant to observe that Jean Grondin, one of the three French co-
translators, and Gianni Vattimo, the Italian translator, were both Gadamer’s dedicated 
students and are widely regarded as two of the foremost exponents of philosophical 
hermeneutics. In other words, neither Grondin and Vattimo’s loyalty to Gadamer’s 
thought nor their expertise in matters Gadamerian can be reasonably questioned. 
Nonetheless, it is the published English translation that comes closest to doing justice 
to Gadamer’s text. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G Marshall write in these terms: “It 
is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all”.113 Still, 
Weinsheimer and Marshall problematically introduce the first person plural, twice, 
while Gadamer had elected to retain the third person impersonal throughout – after 
his mentor Martin Heidegger, perhaps, who makes conspicuous use of the expression 
“das Man” in his own work.114 And then, there is the addition of the word “way” in the 
expression “a different way” (the German term would be “Weg”, which is not in Gadamer’s 
text). 
My basic claim is that the francophone, italophone, or anglophone writer 
who would choose to rely exclusively on the Fruchon/Grondin/Merlio, Vattimo, or 
Weinsheimer/Marshall translation without investing the time and effort to verify 
these translations against the source-text would fail to appreciate that for Gadamer 
the emergence of an understanding is not in the least ordinary (contrary to what 
the published French text holds); would fail to realize that Gadamer’s focus was not 
understanding in general (contrary to what the published Italian text suggests); and 
would fail to acknowledge that Gadamer did not write in the consensual language that 
the term “we” intimates (contrary to what the published English text indicates).
Let me emphasize my steadfast contention one more time: while evidently 
convenient, it can be risky to rely on published translations, no matter how authoritative 
they appear to be – either on account of the publisher’s prestige, of the translator’s 
eminence, or both. Why would you want the published translation’s inadequacies to 
become yours?
113  GADAMER, H.-G. Truth and Method. 2nd English edn. J. Weinsheimer; D. Marshall (transl.). New York: 
Continuum, 2004. p. 296.
114  Eg: DREYFUS, H. L. Interpreting Heidegger on Das Man. Inquiry, London, v. 38, n. 4, p. 423-430, 1995; 
ROBINSON, D. Critical Translation Studies. London: Routledge, 2017. p. 113-23.
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10  Translation must not abide by a method.
I wish to return to method, briefly. “Just as comparison is not a methodology, the idea 
of translation must not be combined with any form of methodology”.115 Resolutely 
heed Clive Scott’s introspective guidance, then: “My version of translation is without 
methodologies and a code of practice”.116 (Scott is a foremost scholar in comparative 
literature and translation studies.) The governing idea must therefore be that 
translation, envisaged as a form of comparative interpretation, should not “poin[t] to 
a method but rather to a scope and a disposition toward knowledge”,117 a strategy that 
Simone Glanert expressly recommends with specific reference to comparative law 
broadly understood on the assumption that there simply cannot be anything groove-
like about a process of comparison-as-translation-as-interpretation.118 For his part, 
bringing to bear a philosophical perspective ranging beyond the case of translation, 
Theodor Adorno, without encouraging an appeal to “the arbitrariness of bare ideas and 
randomness”, percipiently holds that “where we think in a pithy sense, we really think 
always-already unmethodically”.119
No more, I think, need usefully be said.
11  Translation must track the source-text as closely as possible even if 
it should make for disruptive reading in the target-language. 
Assume the Portuguese sentence “Eu amo colher pitangas”. I hold that the London-
based English translator, eschewing the non-translation “I love to pick pitangas”, should 
write “I love to pick Brazilian cherries”, thus signalling the foreignness of the source-text 
through the translating language, since “pitangas”, strictly speaking, are not cherries. 
And, because “pitangas” are not cherries, this translator should avoid “I love to pick 
cherries”, that is, he should resist selecting the closest local fruit, the one that will readily 
speak to an English readership in New York and would make the reader forget that he 
is reading about a foreign fruit.
115  YENGOYAN, A. On the Issue of Comparison. In: YENGOYAN, A. (ed.). Modes of Comparison. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2006. p. 15.
116  SCOTT, C. The Work of Literary Translation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. p. 245.
117  MELAS, N. All the Difference in the World. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2007. p. 30.
118  See GLANERT, S. Method? In: MONATERI, P. G. (ed.). Methods of Comparative Law. Cheltenham: Elgar, 
2012. p. 61-81.
119  ADORNO, T. W. Vorlesung über Negative Dialektik. R. Tiedemann (ed.). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2007 [1965]. 
p. 214 [“die Willkür des bloßen Einfalls und die Zufälligkeit”/“wo wir im prägnanten Sinn denken, denken wir 
eigentlich immer schon unmethodisch”].
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No translation can escape politics, and no translation can eschew ethics. Now, I 
claim that the politics and the ethics that inform translation must be resolutely other-
oriented – or, if you will, they must operate other-wise, that is, they must display wisdom 
vis-à-vis otherness with a view to doing it optimal justice. Concretely, a politically 
and ethically sound translation compels the translator to introduce foreignness into 
the target-language even if this should entail this language’s transformation through 
formulations straining convention inasmuch as they do not read as smoothly as a 
“standard” text written from within the target-language itself.120 It is indeed crucial that 
the transportation of a text across languages should not prompt the elision or erasure 
of all foreignness: the foreign text must emphatically not be made into a local text to 
the point where readers in the target-language actually forget that they are reading a 
foreign text. Even in the target-language, the foreignness of the text must be admitted 
rather than camouflaged, which means that the translator’s power must exercise itself 
both strategically and altruistically – strategicaltruistically.121 To allow for the survival of 
the source-text in a foreign language is thus both a stake and a responsibility. Admittedly, 
this view very much remains a minority position, certainly in English where there prevails 
“[t]he dominance of fluency in English-language translation”,122 “comments hav[ing] 
grown amazingly consistent in praising fluency while damning deviations from it”.123 
(To be sure, fluency answers commercial pressure for uncomplicated readability.) Note 
that the politics and the ethics I address also concern the translator himself who, in 
foreignizing the text he is writing, does not pretend to be investing it with the kind of 
original authority that it does not have and that it is not entitled to claim.
Albeit structurally maladjusted, although “all disadjusted”,124 translations must 
(try to) be just. Indeed, a translation can only be just – it can just be just. Such is the 
best that it can be. However, as a matter of the recognition and respect that are due 
120  For Venuti (note 44), p. 19, foreignization is a “fundamentally ethical attitud[e] towards a foreign text and 
culture”. An earlier expression of this view is in Walter Benjamin’s. In his “Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers” (note 
53), p. 61, Benjamin endorses Rudolf Pannwitz, a nineteenth-century German poet and philosopher, saying 
of Pannwitz’s observations on translation in Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur (1917), that they “may easily be 
the best on the theory of translation that has been published in Germany” [“leicht das Beste sein dürften, was 
in Deutschland zur Theorie der Übersetzung veröffentlicht wurde”]. Benjamin’s long quotation of Pannwitz’s 
features the following sentence: “[T]he fundamental error of the translator is that he clings to the random state 
of his own language instead of letting it be powerfully moved by the foreign language” [“(D)er grundsätzliche 
irrtum des übertragenden ist dass er den zufälligen stand der eignen sprache festhält anstatt sie durch die 
fremde sprache gewaltig bewegen zu lassen”].
121  I am not thinking in terms of “the absolute privilege of the original”, which Gayatri Spivak does well to 
challenge: SPIVAK, G. C. Translator’s Preface. In: DERRIDA, J. Of Grammatology. G. C. Spivak (transl.). Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. p. lxxxvi. I deliberately refer to this edition of Spivak’s commentary.
122  Venuti (note 44), p. 2.
123  ibid.
124  Derrida (note 77), p. 43 [“toutes désajustées”].
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to the other’s text (or law-text), translation must strive, through optimal hearkening to 
otherness, to be just. Indeed, to be just is more important than to be correct or exact. 
Writing to his long-standing confidante and lover – a translator of Flaubert, of Michel 
Tournier, of Marguerite Duras, and of many other French authors – Beckett, soliciting 
a reaction to a draft translation of his, thus astutely observes: “[A]ccuracy obviously 
secondary consideration”.125 The goal, then, is le mot juste. In French, the word “juste” 
seems especially helpful for it conveys at once the ideas of “justness” and “aptness”.126
In its quest for the just word-in-translation – or for the just distance from 
the source-text – a translator must therefore attempt to do justice to the text being 
translated through a process of incessant negotiation with it. But translative justice is 
not exclusively “of” the text in the sense at least that the source-text’s claim to justice 
requires to be formulated through a process of interpretation and thus to be conveyed 
“to” the text by the interpreter as hearkener. Yet, justice must be understood as being 
strictly a matter of place and time, that is, as being thoroughly immanent or embedded 
or singular: it is of that text, it is being conveyed by this interpreter on this occasion, then. 
As regards translation, justice is but the application of local interpretive knowledge in 
timely response to the source-text’s interpellation, a process that will itself be validated 
or invalidated by reference to further interpretive knowledge, either here or elsewhere 
(think of any situated readership). Let me repeat: a translation cannot be expected – 
and does not need – to be correct, but it must be just and hopefully find itself accepted 
as just. One must integrate translation within a theory of justice, no less.127 
The disruption in the target-language may require an explanation so as to 
avoid undue disconcertion on the reader’s part. I recommend that such additional 
enlightenment be left to the notes – which, conveniently, should take the form of 
footnotes rather than endnotes. While perhaps expressing less than full support for 
Nabokov’s stance – “I want translations with copious footnotes, footnotes reaching 
up like skyscrapers to the top of this or that page so as to leave only the gleam of 
one textual line between commentary and eternity”128 – I do find that glosses are in 
principle eminently meritorious and helpful. (Incidentally, these annotations need 
125  Letter from S. Beckett to B. Bray in CRAIG, G. et al (eds.). The Letters of Samuel Beckett. vol. 2. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011 [14 November 1959]. p. 255.
126  For an argument in favour of just translation, see generally Glanert and Legrand (note 14).
127  This is the leitmotiv in Lawrence Venuti’s influential scholarship as it draws heavily on Antoine Berman’s. 
See eg Venuti (note 44) and BERMAN, A. La Traduction et la lettre ou l’auberge du lointain. Paris: Editions du 
Seuil 1999 [1985]. For a connection between justice and hospitality with specific reference to translation, see 
DERRIDA, J. La chance et l’hospitalité. Trois, Laval (Québec), v. 14, n. 2-3, p. 71-83, 1999. p. 72 : “Just translation, 
is that not hospitality itself?” [“La traduction juste, n’est-ce pas l’hospitalité même?”].
128  NABOKOV, V. Problems of Translation: “Onegin” in English. Partisan Review, New York, v. 22, n. 4, p. 496-
512, 1955. p. 522.
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not limit themselves to the source-text and its cultural circumstances, but can well 
extend to the target-language and explain, by way of linguistic introspection so to 
speak, how it is being revisited with a view to accommodating foreignness.) Let me, 
then, re-state the matter in slightly different terms. Translation must sanction the 
foreign’s preponderance. Rather than assimilate or appropriate the foreign, instead 
of taming and integrating the foreign, the translator must concede defeat, allowing 
his intervention to be simultaneously strong and weak. Even as it is strong because it 
wrestles, courageously, with the source-language, translation must ultimately accept to 
subordinate itself to foreignness. It must implement its inescapable weakness vis-à-vis 
the foreign. 
Consider the following illustration showing how the translator’s goal must not 
be to create a thoroughly local text out of the foreign one, but instead to bring the local 
reader to the foreign text’s foreignness – to get this reader to appreciate at all times 
that although he is reading in “his” language,129 what he is reading remains foreign. 
Choosing my example literally at random (I must have come across hundreds of such 
illustrations), I refer to L’Ecriture et la différence, which appeared in 1967 as Derrida’s first 
authored book, a few months before De la grammatologie. In a chapter entitled “Freud 
et la scène de l’écriture”, which had been published in the literary journal Tel Quel the 
year before, Derrida addresses translation in these terms:
“Or un corps verbal ne se laisse pas traduire ou transporter dans une autre langue. Il est 
cela même que la traduction laisse tomber. Laisser tomber le corps, telle est même l’énergie 
essentielle de la traduction”.130
Released by the University of Chicago Press in 1978, more than ten years after 
the French publication, the English translation is the work of Alan Bass, a noted philos-
opher and practicing psychoanalyst. Bass’s text runs thus:
“The materiality of a word cannot be translated or carried over into another language. 
Materiality is precisely that which translation relinquishes. To relinquish materiality: such is 
the driving force of translation”.131
129  Cf. Derrida (note 55), p. 39: ‘[A] language does not belong” [“(U)ne langue, ça n’appartient pas”].
130  Derrida (note 92), p. 312.
131  DERRIDA, J. Writing and Difference. A. Bass (transl.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. p. 210.
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I suggest five observations in support of the view that Bass’s translation is 
insufficiently sensitive to the need to preserve foreignness in the target-language. To 
make this point differently, I hold that Bass is unduly concerned with writing in “good” 
(or conventional) English and insufficiently preoccupied with attending to the abiding 
Frenchness of Derrida’s text (not to mention its characteristic “derridaneity”).132
First, Derrida begins his statement with “Or”, a conjunction linking the relevant 
sentence with the previous one – a word that, in this context, could be translated as 
“Now”. Bass ignores this coupling, in effect denying Derrida’s “building-block” approach 
to argumentation and rhetoric. 
Secondly, “un corps verbal” becomes “[t]he materiality of a word”. Even someone 
who has minimal French, I suggest, is readily able to appreciate that Bass is moving 
well away from Derrida. In the sense in which Derrida is using it, the term “verbal” refers 
to what concerns the word (from the latin “verbum”, which means “word”). Derrida’s 
reference is to the chain of graphematic signifiers that constitute the text, the very 
inscriptions themselves, the marks on the page. Here, Derrida’s French is concrete and 
metaphoric, while Bass’s English is more abstract and perhaps more precise. Along the 
way, not only is Derrida’s French vocabulary being redirected, but so is his allegiance 
to a certain philosophical style. While Derrida’s philosophy adheres to a more literary 
discourse – not unlike, say, Nietzsche’s or Heidegger’s – Bass’s English readily evokes the 
British/US philosophical tradition and its analytical predilections (think of John Austin 
or Bertrand Russell).133 Along analogous lines, Derrida’s “l’énergie essentielle” becomes 
“the driving force”. 
Thirdly, Derrida writes that this “corps verbal” he is discussing “ne se laisse pas 
traduire ou transporter”. Specifically, Derrida is deploying “laisser” as a pronominal verb, 
which means that he is mobilizing the impersonal reflexive pronoun “se”. Derrida’s focus 
is thus squarely on that “corps verbal” and on its refusal to allow itself to be “translate[d] 
or transport[ed]”. If you will, Derrida emphasizes the “corps verbal”’s own unwillingness 
to be moved across languages – its own intrinsic reticence to displacement. For his part, 
Bass turns his attention away from the “corps verbal” towards the process of translation. 
Stressing the process’s limits, he holds of the “corps verbal” that it “cannot be translated 
or carried over”. The limitation is no longer inherent to the “corps verbal” itself, to its 
resistance; instead, it has become processual – a fact having to do with the matter of 
translation, perhaps with the translator.
132  Is it necessary to emphasize that the issue is not at all Bass’s competence? For observations on the 
meticulousness with which Bass acquitted himself of his translative task, see PEETERS, B. Derrida. Paris: 
Flammarion, 2010. p. 284. For anecdotes expressing the proximity (and therefore the ease of communication) 
between Bass and Derrida, see id., p. 283-84, 512, 516-17, 524, and 688n3. Bass also translated Derrida’s 
Marges. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972 ; Positions (note 66); and La Carte postale. Paris: Flammarion, 1980.
133  See Venuti (note 44), p. 35-36.
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Fourthly, Bass lets go of the chain of French signifiers, that is, he does not reprise 
French syntax and its placement of adjectives after nouns (as in “un corps verbal” or 
“l’énergie essentielle”). Presumably, Bass holds that even as the location of adjectives 
after nouns is standard usage in French, it has become archaic in English. But as he 
deviates from Derrida’s French syntax (“[t]he materiality of a word”, “the driving force”), 
Bass is, in effect, anglicizing the text.
Fifthly, Bass withdraws from the French text by refusing to abide by certain 
words or expressions (“transporter” becomes not “transport”, but “carried over”; “cela 
même” becomes not “that itself”, but “precisely”; “laisse tomber” becomes not “lets 
drop”, but “relinquishes”). 
I do not seek to deny Bass’s capture of Derrida’s three-fold argument that the 
chain of graphematic signifiers constituting the foreign text inevitably cannot be 
reproduced in translation, that the translator therefore renounces this reproduction, and 
that such abdication is effectively the very gist of translation – in the sense at least that 
translation is primordially a departure from the sequence of syllables that are inscribed 
as the foreign text. But I maintain that Bass’s English text ultimately features undue 
ethnocentrism.134 Not only is there an excessive loss of intratextual effects – the singular 
texture of the source-text is forsaken in a number of important respects – but there is 
also an exorbitant forfeiture of intertextual effects as many of the singular evocations of 
the source-language within the source-text are sacrificed.135 Even as every translation 
necessarily generates difference, Bass’s translation produces the kind of difference that 
fails to do justice to Derrida’s French text. For my part, I would, at this writing, translate 
Derrida’s sentence as follows (I copy Bass’s translation en regard in order to facilitate the 
identification of the many differences between the two interventions):
134  I am minded to quote Derrida in DERRIDA, J. De la grammatologie. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967. p. 178: 
“[O]ne will apparently avoid ethnocentrism at the very moment when it will have already operated in depth, 
silently imposing its ongoing concepts of speech and of writing” [“(O)n évitera en apparence l’ethnocentrisme 
au moment même où il aura déjà opéré en profondeur, imposant silencieusement ses concepts courants de la 
parole et de l’écriture”].
135  Cf. Venuti (note 44), p. 35.
[PL] “Now, a body verbal does not let it-
self be translated or transported into an-
other language. It is that indeed which 
translation lets drop. To let drop the 
body, such is even the energy essential 
to translation”.
[Bass] “The materiality of a word cannot 
be translated or carried over into an- 
other language. Materiality is precisely 
that which translation relinquishes. To 
relinquish materiality: such is the driving 
force of translation”.
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And here is my translation vis-à-vis Derrida’s text:
As I translate, I attempt to reprise the foreign text as closely as I can, if at all 
possible to track it word by word,136 without being too concerned with the disruption 
that I may provoke in my anglophone reader’s readerly expectations. (Derrida’s French 
text numbers thirty-seven words, while my English translation has thirty-six.) Again, 
my abiding concern is to preserve some at least of the foreignness of the source-text 
in the target-language with a view to doing justice to the source-text’s singularity – 
to ensuring that foreignness features a remainder within the target-text. Once more, 
this goal must mean that my anglophone reader may find himself discountenanced. 
I accept that interference. Indeed, I welcome such disturbance. In Venuti’s terms, the 
idea is that “[i]n its effort to do right abroad, [...] translation practice must do wrong at 
home, deviating enough from native norms to stage an alien reading experience”.137 
Now, the expression “do[ing] wrong at home” requires to be promptly qualified, for 
“[t]he translator enriches his tongue by allowing the source language to penetrate and 
modify it”.138 
By way of further illustration of the foreignizing strategy that I defend, I 
proceed to show two English interventions as regards an influential German treatise in 
comparative law along with the German source-text. These translations are Tony Weir’s 
136  Cf. DERRIDA, J. Qu’est-ce qu’une traduction “relevante”? Paris: L’Herne, 2005. p. 22-23: “So that one 
legitimately uses the word ‘translation’ [...], it must be that [...] the translation be quantitatively equivalent to the 
original. [...] [I]t is not about counting the number of signs [...], but counting the number of words” [“Pour qu’on 
se serve légitimement du mot ‘traduction’ (...), il faut que (...) la traduction soit quantitativement équivalente à 
l’original. (...) (I)l ne s’agit pas de compter le nombre des signes (...), mais de compter le nombre des mots”]. See 
also Derrida (note 39), p. 204: “When the translator [...] can add a note, or else put words between brackets, 
obviously, what he does is not an operation of translation at that moment; to comment, to analyze, to warn, it 
is not to translate [...]. [...] [A]s soon as one puts two words or three for one, and that the translation becomes 
analytical explicitation, it is no longer a translation in the strict sense” [“Quand le traducteur (...) peut ajouter une 
note, ou bien mettre des mots entre crochets, évidemment, ce qu’il fait n’est pas une opération de traduction 
à ce moment-là; commenter, analyser, mettre en garde, ce n’est pas traduire (...). (...) (D)ès que l’on met deux 
mots ou trois pour un, et que la traduction devient explicitation analytique, ce n’est plus une traduction au sens 
strict”].
137  Venuti (note 44), p. 15-16.
138  Steiner (note 36), p. 67.
“Now, a body verbal does not let itself be 
translated or transported into another 
language. It is that indeed which trans-
lation lets drop. To let drop the body, 
such is even the energy essential to 
translation”.
“Or un corps verbal ne se laisse pas tra-
duire ou transporter dans une autre 
langue. Il est cela même que la traduction 
laisse tomber. Laisser tomber le corps, 
telle est même l’énergie essentielle de la 
traduction”.
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and appear as Oxford University Press’s “official” or authorized English version. Along 
the way, I add my own suggestions.139
Another exemple, also drawn from Zweigert and Kötz’s book,140 reads thus:
In these two instances, it must be clear that Weir’s translations are English-
language-oriented, that is, they seek to re-write the German text into elegant English, 
even if this strategy must mean departing from the German source (which Weir 
139  ZWEIGERT, K; KÖTZ, H. Introduction to Comparative Law. 3rd edn. T. Weir (transl.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998. p. 44; Zweigert and Kötz (note 17), p. 43. Incidentally, I fundamentally disagree with 
Zweigert and Kötz’s advice, which I would literally turn on its head so that the comparatist approaches legal 
solutions as the instantiations of a local cultural discourse that they necessarily are.
140  Zweigert and Kötz (note 139), p. 10; Zweigert and Kötz (note 17), p. 11. Again, I hold diametrically opposite 
views to Zweigert and Kötz’s. The cultural unfastening they advise is neither possible nor desirable. Meanwhile, 
the conceptual neutrality they seek can only pertain to the realm of fiction, which brings to mind the image of 
the proverbial red herring.
[Weir] “[T]he solutions 
[comparatists] find in 
the different jurisdic-
tions must be cut loose 
from their conceptual 
context and stripped of 
their national doctrinal 
overtones”. 
[Weir] “[Comparatists] 
must cut themselves 
loose from their own 
doctrinal and juridical 
preconceptions and lib-
erate themselves from 
their own cultural con-
text in order to discover 
‘neutral’ concepts with 
which   to    describe    […] 
problems”.
[PL] “The solutions of the 
investigated legal or-
ders are to be freed of all 
systematic concepts of 
these legal orders, to be 
unfastened out of their 
solely-national dogmatic 
incrustations”. 
[PL] “[T]he comparatist 
must unfasten himself 
from his own juridi-
cal-dogmatic preconcep-
tions and his own cul-
tural context and must 
avail himself of ‘neutral’ 
concepts”.  
“Die Lösungen der unter-
suchten Rechtsordnun-
gen sind von allen sys-
tematischen Begriffen 
dieser Rechtsordnungen 




[muß sich] von seinen 
eigenen juristisch-dog-
matischen Vorverständ-
nissen und seinem eige-
nen kulturellen Umfeld 
lösen und sich ‘neutraler’ 
Begriffe bedienen muß”.
PIERRE LEGRAND
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 3, p. 601-654, set./dez. 2021.642 
repeatedly does). Here, the translator’s goal, I surmise, is effectively to ensure that an 
anglophone reader will forget that he is reading a German text. As I explain, I beg to 
differ, and I argue that the anglophone reader must be reminded at all times, through 
an “agrammaticality effect” if you will, that he is indeed reading a foreign text.141 To my 
mind, such is the merit, in the formulations that I devise, of terms like “the investigated 
legal orders”, “of these legal orders”, and “juridical-dogmatic”. The idea that I am 
deliberately implementing is very much to generate a friction, to strike a discordant 
note, to impede the fluency of the target-language so that the discontinuities on 
display will put the anglophone reader on notice that things are not normal, that it is 
not reading business as usual, so to speak.142 
The translator must therefore resist any urge towards embellishment and 
eschew the siren calls of the “belles infidèles” in order to avoid charges of undue 
ethnocentrism. In 1648, when Gilles Ménage (1613-92), a famous linguist and literary 
critic, was asked what he thought of a certain translation, he replied that it reminded 
him of one of his former mistresses: it was as beautiful as it was infidel. The sobriquet 
“belle infidèle” stuck, and it continues to designate a practice, often thought to be 
particularly prevalent in France, whereby, say, the foreign text is Frenchified so that it 
reads as elegantly in French as if it had originally been written in French. For adherents 
to the “belles infidèles” strategy, what Haun Saussy styles “a tension between ethics and 
aesthetics” must be resolved in favour of beauty.143 I argue that precisely the opposite 
is the case. For the sake of the recognition of otherness and in the name of respect 
for otherness, it is crucial that the translator should avoid any attempt to embellish 
the translation in the target-language. Despite what a literal appreciation of the French 
expression might suggest, it is not so much a matter of fidelity as it is a question of 
justice to the source-text. The three short illustrations that follow reveal some of the 
pitfalls that must be circumvented.
Consider GEM Anscombe’s translation of Wittgenstein’s posthumously pub-
lished Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen), which appeared 
in 1953. In translating §38, Anscombe renders the German “Denn die philosophischen 
Probleme enstehen, wenn die Sprache feiert” not as “For philosophical problems arise 
141  BONOLI, L. Lire les cultures. Paris: Kimé, 2008. p. 98 [“effet d’agrammaticalité”] (emphasis omitted).
142  id, p. 58, where Lorenzo Bonoli refers, approvingly, to “a friction that happens within the horizon of a 
familiar sense but that manifests the existence of something that contrasts with that horizon and that comes 
to interrupt the comfort ensured by the ‘already known’” [“un heurt qui se produit à l’intérieur d’un horizon de 
sens familier mais qui manifeste l’existence de quelque chose qui entre en contraste avec cet horizon et qui 
vient interrompre le confort assuré par le ‘déjà connu’”] (emphasis omitted). Cf. Bellos and Scheppele (note 67), 
p. 270: “In general, my preference in translation is to use a word that will make the foreign institution strange, 
because you want people to stop and say, ‘What is this? I don’t know what this is.’ [...] [Y]ou want people to stop 
and realize that they don’t know what they don’t know”. The words are Scheppele’s.
143  SAUSSY, H. Translation as Citation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. p. 11.
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when language idles”, but as “[...] when language goes on holiday”.144 Here, Anscombe’s 
familiar register does violence to the foreign text, her formulation being highly hetero-
geneous vis-à-vis it. Indeed at §132,145 Wittgenstein has “Die Verwirrungen, die uns be- 
schäftigen, entstehen gleichsam, wenn die Sprache leerläuft, nicht wenn sie arbeitet”, 
which he himself agreed to have translated as “The confusions which occupy us arise 
when language is, as it were, idling, not when it is doing work”.146
Another example of unacceptable beautification of the foreign text involves 
a deliberate anachronism, which includes a reference to “Cape Kennedy” in the 
translation of a passage from Homer’s Iliad regarding Achilles’s talking horses and the 
way they soar in the skies – “as in dreams, or at Cape Kennedy, they rise”.147 Is there any 
reasonable way in which this translation can be said to be appropriately responding to 
a hidden claim of the source-text, or is it not illegitimately imposing itself on the foreign 
through a locutory gimmick being deployed by an interpreter who would no longer be 
operating as a hearkener, who would not be addressing the text’s genius loci? I maintain 
that such translational anarchism must steadfastly be avoided. (It is false.)
And to return to comparative law, when Zweigert and Kötz write “Unterschiede 
[sind] in Wahrheit nicht relevant”,148 a just translation should read “Differences are 
in truth not relevant”, not “[D]ifferences are really immaterial”.149 While “in truth not 
relevant” may not be as elegant as “really immaterial”, the translator, in wanting to bring 
stylistic improvement to the English version, is not being just to the German original.
In sum, you will do very well to heed Nabokov’s advice : “The clumsiest literal 
translation is a thousand times more useful than the prettiest paraphrase”150 – which 
means, for instance, that the source-text’s repetitious words must not be replaced and 
its equivocities not be disambiguated.
How much foreignization is needed, though? To be sure, “the terms 
‘domestication’ and ‘foreignization’ do not establish a neat binary opposition”.151 Rather, 
one must think along the lines of a sliding scale, of a spectrum featuring various 
144  WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. German-English edn. G. E. M. Anscombe (transl.).  Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953. p. 19. This translation is retained in WITTGENSTEIN, L. Philosophical Investigations. 4th 
German-English edn. P. M. S. Hacker; J. Schulte (eds.). G. E. M. Anscombe; P. M. S. Hacker; J. Schulte (transl.). 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. p. 23.
145  Wittgenstein/Hacker and Schulte (note 144), p. 56.
146  See BAKER, G. P.; HACKER, P. M. S. Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning. vol 1. 2nd edn. P. M. S. 
Hacker (ed.). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. p. 114.
147  LOGUE, C. War Music: An Account of Books 1-4 and 16 to 19 of Homer’s Iliad. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997. p. 214.
148  Zweigert and Kötz (note 17), p. 60.
149  Zweigert and Kötz (note 139) p. 62. Meanwhile, pace Zweigert and Kötz, differences across laws are of the 
utmost relevance and must emphatically be the primary focus of comparative law.
150  Nabokov (note 128), p. 496.
151  Venuti (note 44), p. 19.
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degrees of transition. Nonetheless, one must accept that ultimately “foreignness kills 
the foreign”.152 Indeed, the mobilization of amendments to the target-language that 
are too idiosyncratic, or perhaps too numerous, can reasonably be expected to entail 
the translation falling prey to a failure of persuasion – a rejection that would effectively 
foreclose the readership’s access to the source-text. This outcome can also result from 
a recourse to loan words, that is, words that are lifted from the source-text and carried 
as such into the target-language. Illustrations of the two hurdles that I mention are as 
follows.
Excessive idiosyncrasy
Evidently, “Wörterbuch” (dictionary) must not be translated as “book of words” and 
“Krankenschwester” (nurse) must not become “the sick’s sister” – two examples 
readily demonstrating how a surfeit of foreignization becomes counter-productive 
in terms of intelligibility in the target-language. Now, consider what are arguably 
two of Heidegger’s most famous sentences: “Die Sprache spricht. Wie ist es mit ihrem 
Sprechen?”.153 In order for English to capture the German assonance in the first sentence, 
if necessarily imperfectly, one would have to translate either as “Language languages” 
or “Speaking speaks”. Either way, the foreignization would be excessive and run the risk 
of placing the English text (and, by extension, the author’s philosophical work) beyond 
the reach of the anglophone reading public. In order to avoid such impasse, Albert 
Hofstadter wisely translates Heidegger’s text as “Language speaks”, a formulation that, 
while suitably cryptic and therefore challenging enough from the standpoint of an 
anglophone reader, avoids the kind of undue foreignizing that would have proven 
unhelpful.154 If anything, the second sentence demanded even more restraint on the 
translator’s part. A literal translation would feature “What is it about her speaking?”, the 
feminine addressing the fact that in German the word “Sprache” carries this gender. 
In English, however, the use of “she” would definitely make for undue foreignization. 
While Hofstadter writes “What about its speaking?”, I suggest that “What is it with its 
speaking?” would have struck a more foreign-orientated note – that this form of words 
would have been more just to the foreign text – without sacrificing English intelligibility. 
Recourse to loan words
I mentioned Camus’s incipit in L’Etranger, and I observed that when Random House 
commissioned a retranslation in the 1980s, Matthew Ward produced the following: 
152  CASSIN, B. Eloge de la traduction. Paris: Fayard, 2016. p. 188 [“l’étrangeté tue l’étranger”].
153  Heidegger (note 4), p. 16.
154  HEIDEGGER, M. Language. In: Poetry, Language, Thought. A. Hofstadter (transl.). New York: Harper & Row, 
1971 [1959]. p. 191.
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“Maman died today” (supra). I suggest that Ward’s incorporation of the loan word 
“Maman” illustrates how unsatisfactory this process may prove. Indeed, how further 
advanced is the anglophone reader who, presumably, is reading the English translation 
because the French text is presenting him with a difficult linguistic challenge?
12  Recognize that the translator is an inventor.
To assert that the translator is an inventor – that the process of translation is one of 
invention – may strike you as bold, perhaps excessive. In fact, this is precisely what 
is the case. Etymologically, the term “invention” straddles the ideas of finding and 
fashioning (the comparatist comes to the foreign law-text that he finds, there, and then 
moves to articulate it, to fashion it, by way of his translation). In effect, “the concept of 
invention distributes its two essential values between the two poles of the constative 
(to discover or disclose [...]) and the performative (to produce, institute, transform)”, 
there being an “infinitely rapid oscillation” between the two situations.155 Invention? 
The comparatist inventing translation? Yes. He is finding or discovering foreign law, 
and he is fashioning or devising it for the purposes of his re-formulation. In effect, his 
fashioning is indissociable from his finding, since the very act of selection whereby he 
retains some words in the target-language, while dispensing with others, partakes of 
the making of the translation that he will inscribe, perhaps in his comparative study. 
Always, the comparatist must prove himself determined to implement a sophisticated 
appreciation of textuality and thus purport to invent – that is, find-and-fashion – an 
articulable translation that will be suitably haunted by the foreignness of the source-
text through infinitely complex networks of enmeshment.
•
Translation can never reach so far as to embrace fully the foreignness of the foreign 
text, and it can never deploy itself so independently from the translator so that he 
could creditably claim to have eschewed all involvement. Etymologically, “to translate” 
initially comes from “transferre” (“latus”/“latio” is the past participle of “ferre”). The Latin 
verb meant “to carry” or “to bring” (“ferre”) “across” (“trans”). The main idea is that of 
155  Eg: see Derrida (note 2), p. 23 and 25 [“le concept d’invention distribue ses deux valeurs essentielles 
entre les deux pôles du constatif (découvrir ou dévoiler [...]) et du performatif (produire, instituer, 
transformer)”/“oscillation infiniment rapide”]. Derrida is right to claim that “one would no longer say today 
that Christopher Columbus has invented America [...]. [...] [U]sage or the system of certain modern, relatively 
modern conventions would prohibit us from speaking of an invention whose object would be an existence as 
such”: id, p. 41 [“on ne dirait plus aujourd’hui que Christophe Colomb a inventé l’Amérique (...). (...) [L]’usage 
ou le système de certaines conventions modernes, relativement modernes, nous interdiraient de parler d’une 
invention dont l’objet serait une existence comme telle”]. Yet, in the Roman liturgical rite, there was long 
celebrated on 3 May the Invention of the Holy Cross (Inventio Sancta Crucis), that is, St Helena’s discovery of the 
Cross in 326. Having been abolished by Pope John XXIII in 1960, the feast of the Inventio remains important for 
the Church of the East on 13 September. As one applies oneself to repair one’s understanding of translation, 
“one must today reinvent invention”: id, p. 37 [“il faut aujourd’hui réinventer l’invention”].
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conveyance, but it is also that of indistinction. The focus is indeed squarely on identity. 
Now, Gianfranco Folena shows the emergence as of 1400 – as of 5 September 1400, in 
fact – of the term “traducere” to substitute for the word “transferre”. As Folena explains, 
“traducere” features the ideas of crossing and movement, but also, co-constitutively 
and inseparably, that of individuality (Folena invites a comparison of “ferre” and 
“duco”/“dux”), which underlines at once the originality and the personal involvement 
within an intervention thus becoming less anonymous.156 And through his motions 
and elections not only does the translator allow the foreign another life in another 
language, but he also countenances the foreign investing the target-language and 
inflecting it with a view to preserving the singularity of what remains an untranslatable 
idiom. Because translation thus evokes “a braiding together of activity and passivity, 
agency and patiency, the development of a capacity to be acted upon, even as one 
acts”,157 the translator requires, in effect, to learn the “mastery of non-mastery”158 – to 
control a process, the taming of the foreign, that ultimately remains out of his control.
It seems apt to return to the idea of difference. Michael Hofmann, a noted 
poet, literary critic, and translator of German literature into English, writes: “I want, as 
a translator, to make a difference”.159 I am inclined to add that it is good that Hoffman 
should want to make a difference, because he is bound to be doing so. In other words, a 
translator inevitably makes a difference, since duplication across languages lies beyond 
anything structurally possible: translation inherently constitutes “a practice producing 
difference out of incommensurability (rather than equivalence out of difference)”.160 This 
characteristic, inherent to the process of translation, is arguably the most important 
fact that you must constantly heed as you translate.
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